

Appendix

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Appendix Figures




Figure A6.1. Social Engagement and the Marginal Effect of Health Aid by Corruption Level. *Note:* Figure shows average marginal effects of lagged health aid on infant mortality across the observed range of social engagement and for different levels of corruption control. Plot A, B, C, and D visualize the reported estimates of Model 1, 3, 5, and 7, respectively (table A6.3). Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Bureaucratic governance is measured by control over regime corruption, executive corruption, public-sector corruption, and political corruption. The red solid line indicates the interaction of health aid and social engagement at mean levels of corruption control. Weak state capacity is indicated by the green long-dashed line, reflecting one standard deviation below the average level of corruption control. Strong state capacity is indicated by the blue short-dashed line reflecting one standard deviation above the average level of corruption control.




Figure A6.2. Elite-Challenging Action and the Marginal Effect of Health Aid by Corruption Level. *Note:* Figure shows average marginal effects of lagged health aid on infant mortality across the observed range of elite-challenging action and for different levels of bureaucratic governance. Elite-challenging action is measured by the Social Movement Activity (SMA) index. Bureaucratic governance is measured by the extent of control over regime corruption (A) and executive corruption (B). Plot A and B visualize the reported estimates of Model 3 and 5, respectively (table A6.4). The red solid line indicates the interaction of health aid and political engagement at mean levels of corruption control. Weak state capacity is indicated by the green long-dashed line, reflecting one standard deviation below the average level of corruption control. Strong state capacity is indicated by the blue short-dashed line, reflecting one standard deviation above the average level of corruption control.




Figure A6.3. Elite-Challenging Action and the Marginal Effect of Health Aid by Democracy Level. *Note:* Figure shows marginal effects of lagged health aid on infant mortality across the observed range of political engagement and for different levels of democracy. The marginal effect plots consistently demonstrate the synergistic effect of elite-challenging action is most pronounced in states where political rights and civil liberties are guaranteed (A), executive recruitment is open and competitive, parties compete for political influence, the legislature is independent (B–C), and executives are overseen (D). Plots A–D visualize the estimates of Models 1, 4, and 6 (panel 1) and Model 7 (panel 2) reported in table A6.7. Elite-challenging action is measured by the Anti-System Movements index (A–C) and the Social Movement Activity index (D). Democracy is measured by the Freedom House index (A), Coalition to Selectorate Size (CSS) ratio (B), Democracy vs. Dictatorship index (C), and the Executive Oversight index. The red solid line indicates the interaction of health aid and political engagement at mean levels of democracy. Regimes classified as “not free” or dictatorships and countries with a small CSS ratio and weak executive oversight are indicated by the green short-dashed line (weak/small reflecting one standard deviation below the average level of democracy). Regimes classified as “free” or democracies and countries with a large CSS ratio and strong executive oversight are indicated by the blue long-dashed line (strong/large reflecting one standard deviation above the average level of democracy). Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, political engagement, and the nonbinary indicators of democracy are mean centered.

Appendix Tables

Table A3.1. Recipient Countries and Sample Composition

Country	WVS	ISD	V-Dem	Country	WVS	ISD	V-Dem
Albania	1	4	4	Ecuador	1	4	4
Algeria	1	4	4	Egypt	2	4	4
Argentina	3	4	4	El Salvador	1	4	4
Armenia	2	1	4	Estonia	1	2	2
Azerbaijan		4		Ethiopia		2	
Bangladesh	1	4	4	Fiji			4
Belarus		4		Gabon			2
Benin			4	Gambia			4
Bolivia		3	3	Georgia		4	
Bosnia and Herzegovina		3		Ghana	2	3	4
Botswana		4	4	Guatemala		2	2
Brazil	2	4	4	Guyana			2
Bulgaria	1	2	2	Haiti			1
Burkina Faso		2		Honduras		3	3
Burundi			2	Hungary	2	3	3
Cambodia		3	4	India	3	4	4
Cameroon			3	Indonesia	1	3	3
Cape Verde		2		Iran	1	3	4
Central African Rep.			3	Iraq	1		3
Chile	3	4	4	Jamaica			3
China	3	4	4	Jordan	2	3	4
Colombia	3	4	4	Kazakhstan	1		4
Congo			4	Kenya		1	3
Congo, Dem. Rep.			2	Kyrgyzstan	1	4	4
Costa Rica		2	2	Laos			4
Côte d'Ivoire			4	Latvia	1	2	2
Croatia	1	4	4	Lesotho		1	2
Cuba			4	Liberia		1	4
Czech Republic		1	1	Libya	1		3
Dominican Republic	1	3	3	Lithuania	1	2	2

(continued)

Table A3.1. Recipient Countries and Sample Composition (continued)

Country	WVS	ISD	V-Dem	Country	WVS	ISD	V-Dem
Macedonia		3		Russia	3	3	3
Madagascar		1		Rwanda	2	2	3
Malawi		3	3	Senegal		2	4
Malaysia	2		4	Sierra Leone			4
Mali	1	3	4	Slovakia		1	1
Mauritania			4	South Africa	2	3	3
Mauritius			2	Sri Lanka			4
Mexico	3	4	4	Sudan			4
Moldova	2	4	4	Swaziland		2	3
Mongolia		4	4	Syria			3
Morocco	2	4	4	Tajikistan			4
Mozambique		3	3	Tanzania		4	4
Myanmar			3	Thailand	2		4
Namibia		3	4	Togo			4
Nepal			2	Trinidad and Tobago	2		3
Nicaragua		2	2	Tunisia	1	3	3
Niger			4	Turkey	3	4	4
Nigeria		3		Uganda		3	3
Pakistan	1	3	4	Ukraine	3	4	4
Panama		3	3	Uruguay	3	4	4
Papua New Guinea			4	Venezuela	1	2	2
Paraguay		2	2	Vietnam	1	3	4
Peru	3	3	3	Yemen	1		3
Philippines	1	2	2	Zambia	1	3	4
Poland	1	2	2	Zimbabwe		3	3
Romania	3	4	4				

Note: Table shows the number of observations by country as reported in table 5.1, according to Model 1 using the CSO Participatory Environment index from the V-Dem database (N = 101), Model 5 using the membership in leisure and welfare associations from the World Values Survey (WVS) (N = 51), and Model 7 using the Social Engagement Index from the Indices of Social Development (ISD) database (N = 77).

Table A3.2. Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Median	SD	Min.	Max.
Political Engagement						
Participatory Component index (V-Dem)	625	0.44	0.47	0.17	0.02	0.85
Political and Professional Engagement index (V-Dem)	489	0.55	1.07	0.62	-2.55	4.89
Anti-System Movements index (V-Dem)	625	-0.42	-0.56	1.12	-2.68	2.63
Democratic Movements index (V-Dem)	482	-0.11	1.20	-0.10	-2.55	3.06
Social Movement Activity index (WVS)	142	0.21	0.20	0.08	0.04	0.37
Belonging to political or professional association (WVS)	110	0.26	0.23	0.17	0.02	1.00
Volunteering in political or professional association (WVS)	110	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.01	0.38
Social Engagement						
CSO Participatory Environment index (V-Dem)	625	0.54	0.72	1.08	-3.00	2.58
Civil Society Participation index (V-Dem)	625	0.62	0.68	0.22	0.05	0.95
Diagonal Accountability index (V-Dem)	625	0.52	0.64	0.82	-1.72	2.02
Non-Political Engagement index (V-Dem)	482	0.57	0.97	0.65	-1.89	3.63
Social Engagement index (ISD)	310	0.49	0.48	0.11	0.14	0.86
Belonging to leisure and welfare association (WVS)	109	0.30	0.27	0.19	0.01	1.00
Belonging to faith-based association (WVS)	108	0.34	0.26	0.29	0.01	0.96
Volunteering in leisure and welfare association (WVS)	109	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.01	0.54
Volunteering in faith-based association (WVS)	108	0.19	0.13	0.20	0.00	0.79
Health Aid and Population Health						
Mortality rate infant (per 1,000 live births)	655	45.90	37.90	33.13	2.57	170.60
Lagged health aid (T-5 years) per capita	651	4.18	2.33	8.71	0.00	166.80

Note: The table provides summary statistics for the social and political engagement measures used in this study as well as for health aid and public health.

Table A3.3. Variable Description

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
Social engagement	Engagement in leisure and welfare organizations	This index measures citizen's active and passive participation in charitable, cultural, recreational, or environmental organizations. Active engagement is measured by the percentage of the population volunteering in at least one association. Passive membership is operationalized by the share of the population belonging to at least one voluntary association.	WVS (Inglehart et al. 2014)
	Engagement in faith-based organizations	This index measures citizen's active and passive participation in religious organizations. Active or passive engagement is measured by the percentage of the population volunteering in or belonging to a religious organization.	WVS (Inglehart et al. 2014)
	Social Engagement Index (SEI)	The SEI measures a nation's aggregated level of participation in voluntary activities and voluntary time spent on unpaid community work. The SEI (also known as the "clubs and associations" index) combines behavioral and perceptual indicators from public-opinion surveys with perceptual expert judgments and proxy variables (Foa and Tanner 2012, 23–27).	ISD (2013)
	Non-political engagement	This indicator measures the share of a country's population that actively participates in independent non-political associations, such as sports clubs, literary societies, charities, fraternal groups, or support groups.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	CSO Participatory Environment	This index measures whether a country's citizenry is voluntarily active in a diverse set of civil-society organizations (including labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charity organizations, and other NGOs) or whether civil-society activity is mainly state sponsored.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
Elite-entrusting political engagement	Engagement in political and professional organizations	This index measures citizen's active and passive participation in political parties, labor unions, and professional organizations. Active engagement is measured by the percentage of the population volunteering in at least one association. Passive membership is operationalized by the share of the population belonging to at least one voluntary association.	WVS (Inglehart et al. 2014)
	Civil-society participation	This index assesses a country's participatory environment and combines it with information about citizens' involvement in civil-society organizations, the candidate nomination process within party organizations, and women's participation in civil society.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Political and professional engagement	The index captures the share of citizens active in political and professional associations such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, business associations, and trade unions. The index is calculated as the unweighted average of citizens' engagement in political associations and trade unions.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Diagonal accountability	This index measures to what extent governments are held accountable by civil-society organizations and citizen-led accountability actions, including investigative journalism and social mobilization.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
Elite-challenging political engagement	Social Movement Activity (SMA)	The Social Movement Activity (SMA) index measures whether individuals have participated or would participate in elite-challenging action such as signing a petition, joining a boycott, or attending a lawful demonstration. The SMA index construction is based on the methodology suggested by Welzel (2013, 224). The index is calculated by recoding respondents' answers about whether they did do the activity, they might do it, or they would never do it. Respondents who answer "might do," indicating "readiness	WVS (Inglehart et al. 2014)

(continued)

Table A3.3. Variable Description (continued)

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
		to act,” are considered in between respondents who refuse to participate and those who have participated. Although, to give “readiness to act” less weight than action, answers are weighted down. Accordingly, “would never do it” is coded 0, “might do it” is 0.33, and “have done it” is 1.0. Averaging each respondent’s scores over the three activities and calculating each country’s population average per wave leads to the SMA index.	
	Anti-system movements	The Anti-System Movements indicator measures the extent to which peaceful or armed movements seek to change the polity in a fundamental way, thereby posing a threat to incumbent political leaders.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Pro-democratic movements	The Mobilization for Democracy index measures the frequency of pro-democratic mass events such as demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins that seek to protect or advance political rights or civil liberties.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
State capacity and bureaucratic governance	Quality of government	This index measures levels of corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality, which closely mirror the Weberian distinction between legal-rational and traditional authority. The six-point corruption subcomponent focuses on corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favor-for-favors,” secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The six-point law and order subcomponent assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system and popular observance of the law (Teorell et al. 2018, 371–372). Bureaucracy quality (four-point scale) measures the extent of established mechanisms for meritocratic recruitment and career advancement, the autonomy from political pressure, and the capacity to deliver public services continuously without interruptions. The combined Quality of Government index is the average across the three subcomponents.	ICRG (Teorell et al. 2018)

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
	State fragility	This index assesses each country's effectiveness and legitimacy in four dimensions: security, political, economic, and social performance. The effectiveness and legitimacy in the security, political, and social dimensions are each rated on a four-point scale, and the economic effectiveness and legitimacy is rated on a five-point scale. The combined effectiveness score and the legitimacy score are the sum of the four effectiveness and legitimacy subcomponents, respectively. The combined overall State Fragility index is the sum of the effectiveness and the legitimacy score and is inversely related to the level of bureaucratic governance.	Center for Systemic Peace (Teorell et al. 2018)
	Public-sector corruption	Public-sector corruption measures the extent to which public-sector employees misappropriate public resources for private use.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Executive corruption	This index proxies to what extent members of the executive grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Political corruption	This index measures the extent of "petty" and "grand" corruption, bribery, and theft, as well as corruption influencing law-making and its implementation. It combines corruption among public-sector employees and members of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Regime corruption	This index measures how politicians use their offices for private or political gain, focusing on corrupt behavior among high-ranking government officials that exchange resources like political office or licenses, and strategically located individuals (e.g., leaders of trade unions) that provide economic and political support in return.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Control of corruption	This index of corruption control measures the perceived extent to which public power is exercised for private gain as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.	WBG (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011)

(continued)

Table A3.3. Variable Description (continued)

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
Liberal democracy	Polity IV	The index measures the extent of democracy based on three elements: the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express preferences about alternative policies and leaders; the existence of institutionalized constraints on the power of the executive; and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Conversely, autocracies are defined as political regimes that restrict or suppress competitive political participation, in which chief executives are selected within the political elite, and once in office, they exercise power with few institutional constraints. Against this backdrop, the Polity project scores countries' level of institutionalized democracy based on two scales—a democracy scale and an autocracy scale. Both the democracy and autocracy indices are additive 11-point scales ranging from 0 to 10. The democracy indicator is derived from codings of the (a) competitiveness of political participation (+1, +3), (b) the openness (+1) and competitiveness (+1, +2) of executive recruitment, and (c) constraints on the chief executive (+1, +4). The autocracy indicator is derived from codings of the (a) regulation (–1, –2) and competitiveness (–1, –2) of political participation, (b) the openness (–1) and competitiveness (–2) of executive recruitment, and (c) constraints on the chief executive (–1, –3). The combined Polity score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score and ranges from strongly democratic (+10) to strongly autocratic (–10).	Polity IV (Teorell et al. 2018)

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
	Freedom House	The combined index captures the extent of political rights and civil liberties guaranteed in a country. The political-rights scale summarizes expert ratings of 10 items that refer to the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government. For traditional monarchies, the checklist includes two additional discretionary questions. The civil-liberties scale includes 15 questions regarding freedom of expression and belief, freedom of association and organization, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. Scores are assigned to each item on a scale from 0 to 4 and converted into a 7-point scale of political rights and a 7-point scale of civil liberties. Averaging both indices yields the aggregated Freedom House index.	FWS (Teorell et al. 2018)
	Coalition to Selectorate Size ratio	This index measures the extent to which democratic institutions shape politicians' incentives for public-good provision by combining the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and the party system with the independence of the legislature. The index builds upon the idea that politicians' incentives to provide public goods depend on the number of supporters a leader needs to stay in power and the size of the pool from which these supporters are drawn. The number of supporters is measured by the size of the winning coalition. Coalition size is an additive index that increases by one unit for each of the following conditions: (1) the regime is non-military, (2) executive recruitment is competitive, (3) executive recruitment is open, and (4) parties regularly compete for political influence. The size of the pool of the supporters of a political leader is proxied by the size of the selectorate—the smaller the size of the selectorate, the lower supporters'	Polity IV (Teorell et al. 2018)

(continued)

Table A3.3. Variable Description (continued)

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
		loyalty to the incumbent. Selectorate size is coded 0 if no legislature exists, 1 if the legislature is selected by assignment, and 2 if it is elected. To combine leaders' support necessary to stay in power and the size of the selectorate into a composite index, I calculate the ratio of coalition size to selectorate size, which is referred to as the Coalition to Selectorate Size (CSS) ratio. Following Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues, I recode selectorate size into $S = 1/3[\log((S + 1) * 10)]$ to avoid division by 0 (2003, 216).	
	Legislative constraints on the executive	This index captures the extent of oversight over the executive by the legislature and government agencies, such as an ombudsman or a general prosecutor.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Judicial constraints on the executive	This index captures the extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with court rulings.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Executive oversight	This index measures whether a body other than the legislature would question or investigate any unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity of the executive.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Horizontal accountability	This index captures the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials, and punishing improper behavior in order to prevent the abuse of power.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
Decentralization	Administrative decentralization	The binary indicator measures whether subnational governments have extensive taxing, spending, or regulatory authority.	DPI (Beck et al. 2001)
	Political decentralization	The binary variable indicates whether the executive and the legislature at the subnational level are locally elected. The original measure is dichotomized by coding countries as 1 if either the local legislature or the local executive or both are locally elected, and 0 otherwise.	DPI (Beck et al. 2001)

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
	Local/regional government exists	The binary variable indicates whether there is a local/regional government (1) or not (0). Regional government refers to the level just below the national government and includes offices of regional executives like a governor or a regional assembly. Local government refers to the level below the regional government and includes offices of local executives like a mayor.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Local/regional government elected	Countries are coded as 0 if local/regional governments are not elected, 1 if only the local/regional executive is elected, 2 if only the local/regional assembly is elected, and 3 if both the executive and the assembly are elected.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Local/regional offices relative power	The variable indicates the extent to which local/regional offices are relatively autonomous from nonelected bodies.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
	Local/regional government	The variable combines the information on the election of local/regional governments and their relative power with higher scores indicating that local/regional governments are elected and can operate without interference from unelected actors at the local/regional level except for the judiciary.	V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2019)
Socio-economic determinants	Economic development	GDP per capita in constant international US\$ (log transformed)	WDI (Teorell et al. 2018)
	Population size	Number of people living in a recipient country (log transformed)	WDI (Teorell et al. 2018)
	Conflict development	The binary variable measures whether the country is involved in intrastate or interstate conflicts with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths.	UCDP (2015)
	Fertility rate	Fertility is measured as a country's average in total births per woman (log transformed).	WDI (Teorell et al. 2018)
	Female education	The variable measures the average years of schooling among the female population over age 15.	BLEA (Teorell et al. 2018)

(continued)

Table A3.3. Variable Description (continued)

Domain	Indicator	Description	Source
	HIV/AIDS prevalence	The variable measures the percentage of people between 15 and 49 who are infected with HIV (log transformed).	WDI (Teorell et al. 2018)
	Health workforce	The size of the health workforce is measured by the number of physicians per 1,000 people (log transformed).	WDI (Teorell et al. 2018)
	Health expenditures	Public-health expenditures are measured in percent of government expenditures. Public-health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds.	WHO (HNPS 2014)
Public health	Infant mortality	Infant mortality measures the (log-transformed) number of infant deaths per 1,000 live births averaged over the respective five-year period.	WDI (Teorell et al. 2018)
Health aid	Development assistance for health	Health aid is measured as commitments from international donors in per capita terms (\$US) and includes development assistance for reproductive health care, family planning, and HIV/AIDS control—excluding humanitarian (emergency) aid. Data is taken from AidData, which combines Official Development Assistance (ODA) from OECD bilateral donors with development finance of non-OECD bilateral donors and multilateral financial institutions.	AidData (2017), Tierney et al. (2011)

Note: World Development Indicators (WDI), Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem), Worldwide Governance Indicators database (WBG), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Barro and Lee Educational Attainment Dataset (BLEA), World Health Organization (WHO), Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Database of Political Institutions (DPI), Freedom in the World survey, Center for Systemic Peace (CSP), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Indices of Social Development database (ISD).

Table A5.1. Voluntary Activities and Community Work and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health (LDV Estimates)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
DAH (lagged)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.011** (0.005)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Social engagement	0.055 (0.070)	-0.055 (0.083)	0.063 (0.071)	0.078 (0.070)	-0.067 (0.080)	0.029 (0.075)	0.047 (0.072)	0.055 (0.072)	-0.018 (0.076)	-0.008 (0.075)
DAH	-0.159*** (0.048)	-0.129*** (0.049)	-0.138*** (0.050)	-0.134*** (0.051)	-0.099* (0.051)	-0.151*** (0.055)	-0.136*** (0.049)	-0.128** (0.051)	-0.114** (0.054)	-0.109*** (0.053)
* Social engagement										
HIV prevalence (log scale)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.005)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.037*** (0.006)	0.033*** (0.006)
Public-sector corruption control			-0.134*** (0.036)	-0.129*** (0.035)			-0.137*** (0.036)	-0.132*** (0.035)	-0.137*** (0.040)	-0.131*** (0.039)
Government health expenditures				-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)			-0.003 (0.002)		-0.003 (0.002)
Female education						-0.001 (0.004)				
Fertility rate (log scale)							0.027 (0.027)	0.041 (0.031)		
Physicians (log scale)									0.003 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.008)
IMR (lagged)	0.991*** (0.018)	0.972*** (0.020)	0.972*** (0.018)	0.976*** (0.020)	0.959*** (0.021)	0.973*** (0.023)	0.961*** (0.021)	0.957*** (0.025)	0.978*** (0.019)	0.978*** (0.020)
Constant	-0.025 (0.155)	0.203 (0.173)	0.085 (0.150)	0.090 (0.162)	0.396** (0.187)	0.045 (0.190)	0.101 (0.149)	0.137 (0.165)	0.021 (0.154)	0.047 (0.164)

Table A5.1. Voluntary Activities and Community Work and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health (LDV Estimates)
(continued)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Population (log)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP (log)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE		Yes			Yes					
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	231	231	231	227	227	208	231	227	205	202
Countries	69	69	69	68	68	61	69	68	69	68
R-squared	0.986	0.986	0.987	0.987	0.987	0.985	0.987	0.987	0.987	0.988

Note: Table shows estimates of the Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) model with panel corrected standard errors. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Both DAH and social engagement are mean-centered. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Table A5.2. Voluntary Activities and Community Work and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAH (log scale)	-0.041*** (0.014)	-0.046*** (0.016)	-0.043*** (0.013)	-0.033*** (0.012)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.030*** (0.010)
Social engagement	0.151 (0.174)	0.069 (0.169)	0.204 (0.132)	0.196 (0.126)	0.178 (0.136)	0.113 (0.151)	0.127 (0.111)
DAH (log scale) * Social engagement	-0.254** (0.113)	-0.243** (0.098)	-0.267** (0.106)	-0.180** (0.077)	-0.233** (0.098)	-0.252** (0.108)	-0.201** (0.094)
HIV prevalence (log scale)	0.035* (0.019)	0.035* (0.020)	0.028* (0.015)	0.026* (0.014)	0.040** (0.019)	0.041** (0.018)	0.025* (0.014)
Government health expenditures			-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)			(0.049)
Public-sector corruption control				-0.026 (0.079)	-0.050 (0.099)		
Female education						0.007 (0.011)	
Fertility rate (log scale)							0.026 (0.049)
IMR (lagged)	1.063*** (0.079)	1.018*** (0.059)	1.083*** (0.057)	1.072*** (0.064)	1.030*** (0.086)	1.036*** (0.093)	1.067*** (0.048)
Constant	-0.444 (0.477)	0.062 (0.362)	-0.510 (0.466)	-0.433 (0.390)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.444 (0.585)	-0.476 (0.319)

Table A5.2. Voluntary Activities and Community Work and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health (continued)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region FE		Yes					
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	231	231	227	227	231	208	231
Countries	69	69	68	68	69	61	69
Instruments	62	66	67	76	71	71	71
Hansen-test	0.190	0.258	0.283	0.584	0.367	0.711	0.458
AR2	0.664	0.749	0.566	0.434	0.639	0.453	0.505

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Both DAH and social engagement are mean-centered. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A5.3. Civil-Society Participation and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DAH (log scale)	−0.024* (0.013)	−0.023** (0.011)	−0.028** (0.012)	−0.025*** (0.010)	−0.026*** (0.009)
Political engagement	0.085 (0.092)	0.045 (0.086)	−0.000 (0.107)	−0.038 (0.082)	0.127* (0.076)
DAH (log scale) * Political engagement	−0.065* (0.037)	−0.048 (0.037)	−0.082** (0.032)	−0.077** (0.035)	−0.059** (0.028)
Fertility rate (log scale)		0.073 (0.078)	0.125 (0.109)		0.074 (0.100)
Female education			−0.008 (0.015)	−0.012 (0.012)	−0.011 (0.012)
Government health expenditures	−0.006 (0.007)				−0.010** (0.004)
Public-sector corruption control		−0.008 (0.146)			
IMR (lagged)	1.074*** (0.049)	1.131*** (0.051)	1.114*** (0.051)	1.088*** (0.050)	1.051*** (0.053)
Constant	−0.168 (0.451)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.735 (0.499)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Physicians (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	423	426	342	342	339
Countries	124	125	101	101	100
Instruments	64	77	77	68	82
Hansen-test	0.135	0.086	0.128	0.417	0.242
AR2	0.178	0.076	0.117	0.130	0.188

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Political engagement is measured by V-Dem's Civil Society Participation index. Both DAH and political engagement are mean-centered.

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A5.4. Diagonal Accountability and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DAH (log scale)	−0.022** (0.010)	−0.026*** (0.009)	−0.024** (0.010)	−0.026** (0.012)	−0.023* (0.012)
Political engagement		0.019 (0.035)	0.008 (0.027)	0.010 (0.026)	−0.007 (0.026)
DAH (log scale) * Political engagement			−0.013* (0.007)	−0.014* (0.008)	−0.018* (0.010)
Public-sector corruption control	−0.107 (0.157)	−0.089 (0.121)	−0.024 (0.111)		
Fertility rate (log scale)	0.089 (0.114)	0.083 (0.106)	0.059 (0.104)	0.099 (0.102)	
IMR (lagged)	1.099*** (0.052)	1.111*** (0.050)	1.126*** (0.057)	1.130*** (0.058)	1.109*** (0.059)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.887** (0.451)	−0.679 (0.431)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Female education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Physicians (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	342	342	342	342	342
Countries	101	101	101	101	101
Instruments	68	77	86	77	68
Hansen-test	0.141	0.252	0.266	0.105	0.243
AR2	0.135	0.090	0.098	0.102	0.137

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Political engagement is measured by V-Dem's index of Diagonal Accountability. Both DAH and political engagement are mean-centered. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5.5. Elite-Challenging Action and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health

	Anti-System Movements		Pro-Democratic Movements	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DAH (log scale)	−0.027*** (0.009)	−0.021** (0.009)	−0.014 (0.011)	−0.016 (0.010)
Elite-challenging action	0.025 (0.017)	0.035** (0.017)	0.028** (0.013)	0.029 (0.019)
DAH (log scale)	−0.022*** (0.007)	−0.014* (0.008)	−0.012* (0.007)	−0.018** (0.009)
* Elite-challenging action				
Public-sector corruption control	−0.064 (0.106)		−0.081 (0.100)	−0.139 (0.116)
Fertility rate (log scale)	0.079 (0.054)		0.091 (0.063)	0.059 (0.056)
Female education		−0.017 (0.012)		
Physicians (log scale)				−0.009 (0.023)
IMR (lagged)	0.966*** (0.047)	1.014*** (0.045)	1.019*** (0.041)	1.054*** (0.057)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	0.029 (0.328)	−0.265 (0.330)	−0.615 (0.452)
Population (log)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP (log)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	422	350	324	285
Countries	109	91	86	86
Instruments	80	71	80	89
Hansen-test	0.143	0.206	0.210	0.340
AR2	0.392	0.261	0.625	0.984

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Elite-challenging action is measured by the Anti-System Movements (Models 1–2) and Pro-Democratic Movements (Models 3–4) indices. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Both DAH and elite-challenging action are mean-centered.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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Table A5.6. Elite-Challenging Action and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health After Controlling for Democracy and Decentralization

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DAH (log scale)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.011)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.011)
Elite-challenging action	0.030 (0.019)	0.036** (0.018)	0.040** (0.018)	0.002 (0.015)	0.047*** (0.018)
DAH (log scale) * Elite-challenging action	-0.020*** (0.008)	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.020** (0.008)
Public-sector corruption control		-0.198 (0.124)		-0.169 (0.132)	
Fertility rate (log scale)	0.070 (0.057)	0.051 (0.056)	0.073 (0.053)	0.035 (0.070)	0.052 (0.056)
Liberal democracy (V-Dem)	0.006 (0.166)	0.266 (0.162)			
Local government index			0.117** (0.057)		
Locally elected executive/ legislature				-0.061 (0.043)	
Local office power					0.051*** (0.019)
HIV prevalence (log scale)	0.029** (0.014)	0.030** (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.014)
IMR (lagged)	0.996*** (0.047)	0.995*** (0.050)	1.015*** (0.044)	0.942*** (0.066)	1.036*** (0.043)
Constant	0.011 (0.322)	0.091 (0.339)	-0.060 (0.350)	0.176 (0.361)	0.009 (0.308)
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	422	422	416	329	411
Countries	109	109	108	86	108
Instruments	71	80	71	80	71
Hansen-test	0.093	0.204	0.160	0.231	0.258
AR2	0.335	0.504	0.333	0.346	0.440

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Political engagement is measured by the Anti-System Movements index. Both DAH and elite-challenging action are mean-centered. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5.7. Social Engagement and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health I (Heckman Estimation)

	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
DAH (log scale)	-0.022*** (0.006)		-0.026*** (0.006)		-0.025*** (0.006)	
Social engagement	0.076 (0.092)		0.131 (0.097)		0.118 (0.100)	
DAH (log scale) * Social engagement	-0.121** (0.061)		-0.127** (0.061)		-0.133** (0.065)	
Public-sector corruption control	-0.097** (0.042)		-0.104** (0.042)		-0.065 (0.044)	
GDP per capita (log scale)	-0.015 (0.018)	-1.938*** (0.417)	-0.016 (0.018)	-1.938*** (0.400)	-0.033** (0.016)	-1.822*** (0.392)
Liberal democracy		-1.186 (1.419)		-1.068 (1.369)		-1.213 (1.328)
Physicians (log scale)		0.030 (0.356)	0.003 (0.012)	0.085 (0.340)		-0.020 (0.320)
Fertility rate (log scale)			-0.003 (0.043)			
IMR (lagged)	0.959*** (0.026)		0.971*** (0.030)		0.967*** (0.025)	
Constant	0.091 (0.209)	18.035*** (3.539)	0.302 (0.247)	17.932*** (3.397)	0.187 (0.196)	16.917*** (3.329)
Population (log scale)			Yes			
Conflict	Yes		Yes		Yes	
HIV prevalence (log scale)	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Period FE	Yes		Yes			
corr(e.dah_recipient, e.log_imr)	-0.415 (0.485)		-0.535 (0.456)		-0.486 (0.371)	
corr(dah_recipient [ccode],log_imr [ccode])	0.743*** (0.275)		0.849*** (0.233)		0.923*** (0.176)	
Observations	318		318		318	
Countries	95		95		95	

Note: Table shows random-effects linear regression model with endogenous sample selection. The IMR equation is reported in the first column and the selection (DAH recipient) equation in the second column of each model. Corr(e.dah_recipient,e.log_imr) reports the correlation between the observation-level error for the IMR model with the observation-level error for the selection model. Corr(dah_recipient[ccode],log_imr[ccode]) reports the correlation between the panel-level random effect for the IMR and the selection model. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Both DAH and social engagement are mean-centered. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient
(4)		(5)		(6)	
−0.029*** (0.007)		−0.025*** (0.006)		−0.028*** (0.007)	
0.182* (0.099)		0.094 (0.091)		0.164* (0.099)	
−0.124* (0.064)		−0.120** (0.060)		−0.127** (0.064)	
−0.089** (0.044)		−0.052 (0.041)		−0.069 (0.043)	
−0.029* (0.016)	−1.891*** (0.394)	−0.036** (0.016)	−1.825*** (0.369)	−0.028* (0.015)	−1.842*** (0.374)
	−1.135 (1.295)		−1.371 (1.327)		−1.054 (1.327)
0.017 (0.012)	0.114 (0.314)			0.012 (0.011)	
0.038 (0.044)					
0.974*** (0.031)		0.962*** (0.024)		0.992*** (0.025)	
0.431* (0.224)	17.484*** (3.375)	0.218 (0.190)	17.066*** (3.194)	0.329 (0.215)	17.026*** (3.229)
Yes				Yes	
Yes		Yes			
Yes		Yes		Yes	
−0.487 (0.365)		−0.527 (0.370)		−0.534 (0.351)	
0.953*** (0.217)		0.912*** (0.159)		0.946*** (0.235)	
318		346		321	
95		95		95	

Table A5.8. Social Engagement and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health II (Heckman Estimation)

	(7)		(8)		(9)		(10)		(11)	
	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient
DAH (log scale)	-0.031*** (0.007)		-0.028*** (0.006)		-0.025*** (0.006)		-0.022*** (0.006)		-0.022*** (0.006)	
Social engagement	0.168* (0.101)		0.115 (0.097)		0.123 (0.100)		0.075 (0.091)		0.080 (0.093)	
DAH (log scale)	-0.133** (0.064)		-0.145** (0.064)		-0.139** (0.064)		-0.124** (0.061)		-0.125** (0.061)	
* Social engagement										
Public-sector corruption control	-0.092* (0.047)	-5.019 (4.524)	-0.067 (0.042)		-0.061 (0.043)		-0.098** (0.041)		-0.095** (0.041)	
GDP per capita (log scale)	-0.019 (0.016)	-1.819*** (0.454)		-1.921*** (0.358)	-0.033** (0.016)	-1.989*** (0.392)		-2.060*** (0.412)	-0.015 (0.018)	-2.079*** (0.417)
Physicians (log scale)		-0.166 (0.509)		0.049 (0.400)		0.032 (0.405)		0.104 (0.437)		0.118 (0.424)
Fertility rate (log scale)				0.380 (0.944)		0.085 (1.015)		0.380 (1.039)		0.237 (1.068)
IMR (lagged)	0.985*** (0.026)		1.001*** (0.018)		0.966*** (0.026)		0.972*** (0.019)		0.958*** (0.026)	
Constant	0.365* (0.220)	19.538*** (5.746)	-0.174** (0.078)	16.821*** (3.442)	0.193 (0.199)	17.629*** (3.803)	-0.067 (0.080)	18.146*** (4.011)	0.093 (0.212)	18.394*** (4.070)

	(7)		(8)		(9)		(10)		(11)	
	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient
Population (log scale)	Yes									
Conflict	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
HIV prevalence (log scale)	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Period							Yes		Yes	
corr(e.dah_ recipient,e.log_imr)	-0.721** (0.332)		-0.646** (0.289)		-0.517 -0.371		-0.464 (0.486)		-0.437 (0.492)	
corr(dah_ recipient[ccode], log_imr[ccode])	0.776** (0.356)		0.876*** (0.257)		0.928*** -0.184		0.634 (0.402)		0.745*** (0.287)	
Observations	318		323		323		323		323	
Countries	95		96		96		96		96	

Note: Table shows random-effects linear regression model with endogenous sample selection. The IMR equation is reported in the first columns and the selection (DAH recipient) equation in the second column of each model. $\text{Corr}(e.dah_recipient, e.log_imr)$ reports the correlation between the observation-level error for the IMR-model with the observation-level error for the selection model. $\text{Corr}(dah_recipient[ccode], log_imr[ccode])$ reports the correlation between the panel-level random effect for the IMR and the selection model. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Both DAH and social engagement are mean-centered. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5.9. Political Engagement and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health (Heckman Estimation)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient
DAH (log scale)	-0.009*** (0.003)		-0.010*** (0.003)		-0.009*** (0.003)		-0.008** (0.004)	
Political engagement	0.001 (0.006)		0.005 (0.006)		0.002 (0.006)		0.004 (0.006)	
DAH (log scale) * Political engagement	-0.006** (0.003)		-0.006* (0.003)		-0.006* (0.003)		-0.005* (0.003)	
GDP per capita (log scale)	-0.017* (0.010)	-1.430*** (0.201)	-0.017* (0.010)	-1.463*** (0.201)	-0.020** (0.010)	-1.439*** (0.200)	-0.021* (0.011)	-1.593*** (0.238)
Public-sector corruption control	-0.071** (0.030)				-0.071** (0.031)		-0.082** (0.032)	
Liberal democracy		-1.907*** (0.700)		-1.745** (0.705)		-1.860*** (0.690)		-1.928** (0.752)
Physicians (log scale)								0.285 (0.243)
Fertility rate (log scale)	0.045** (0.022)		0.044* (0.023)				0.034 (0.024)	
IMR (lagged)	0.978*** (0.017)		0.985*** (0.017)		0.997*** (0.014)		0.978*** (0.018)	
Constant	0.340** (0.144)	14.624*** (1.777)	0.275* (0.141)	14.848*** (1.776)	0.370** (0.146)	14.684*** (1.773)	0.377** (0.160)	15.872*** (2.110)

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient	IMR (Log Scale)	DAH Recipient
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
corr(e.dah_recipient, e.log_imr)	0.125 (0.386)		0.013 (0.453)		0.159 (0.389)		0.256 (0.325)	
corr(dah_ recipient[ccode], log_imr[ccode])	0.531** (0.234)		0.425* (0.248)		0.546** (0.223)		0.623*** (0.240)	
Observations	611		611		611		550	
Countries	148		148		148		148	

Note: Table shows random-effects linear regression model with endogenous sample selection. The IMR equation is reported in the first column and the selection (DAH recipient) equation in the second column of each model. $\text{Corr}(\text{e.dah_recipient}, \text{e.log_imr})$ reports the correlation between the observation-level error for the IMR model with the observation-level error for the selection model. $\text{Corr}(\text{dah_recipient}[\text{ccode}], \text{log_imr}[\text{ccode}])$ reports the correlation between the panel-level random effect for the IMR and the selection model. Political engagement is measured using the Anti-System Movements index. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Both DAH and political engagement are mean-centered. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A5.10. Quality of Government and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)								
	Quality of Government Index (ICRG)			State Fragility Index			Corruption Control (WBI)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
DAH (log scale)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.016* (0.008)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.021** (0.011)	-0.019 (0.011)
Bureaucratic governance	-0.035 (0.022)	-0.017 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.022)	0.015 (0.036)	0.017 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.044)	-0.046* (0.024)	-0.059 (0.041)	-0.032 (0.042)
DAH (log scale)	-0.005 (0.013)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.015)
* Bureaucratic governance									
Fertility rate (log scale)		0.002 (0.095)	0.055 (0.107)		0.040 (0.077)	0.164* (0.094)		0.030 (0.109)	0.112 (0.140)
Female education		-0.015 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.015)		-0.017 (0.013)	0.000 (0.015)		-0.016 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.017)
HIV prevalence (log scale)	0.033*** (0.010)			0.032*** (0.009)			0.045*** (0.013)		
Physicians (log scale)			0.001 (0.029)			0.002 (0.028)			-0.008 (0.045)
IMR (lagged)	1.022*** (0.048)	1.094*** (0.052)	1.126*** (0.051)	1.037*** (0.042)	1.080*** (0.047)	1.102*** (0.052)	0.988*** (0.063)	1.103*** (0.065)	1.124*** (0.062)
Constant	-0.437 (0.453)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.875* (0.490)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.067 (0.458)	-0.717 (0.593)	0.000 (0.000)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)								
	Quality of Government Index (ICRG)			State Fragility Index			Corruption Control (WBG)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	307	334	297	389	389	341	394	394	346
Countries	78	87	87	99	101	101	100	102	102
Instruments	60	69	78	60	69	78	52	61	70
Hansen-test	0.167	0.195	0.256	0.220	0.232	0.385	0.096	0.028	0.221
AR2	0.331	0.297	0.224	0.052	0.121	0.135	0.334	0.623	0.212

Note: The table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors for different measures of bureaucratic governance according to the Quality of Government index (ICRG), State Fragility index, and corruption control (WBG). State fragility is inversely related to state capacity, bureaucratic governance, and control of corruption. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Both DAH and bureaucratic governance are mean-centered.

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A5.11. Corruption Control and the Effects of Health Aid on Population Health

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)								
	Control over Regime Corruption			Control over Executive Corruption			Control over Public-Sector Corruption		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
DAH (log scale)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.018 (0.012)
Bureaucratic governance	-0.022 (0.017)	0.008 (0.023)	0.018 (0.029)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.024)	-0.005 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.003 (0.037)
DAH (log scale)	0.007 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.010)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.011)
* Bureaucratic governance									
Fertility rate (log scale)		0.095 (0.072)	0.151 (0.116)		0.092 (0.075)	0.138 (0.133)		0.062 (0.093)	0.149 (0.130)
Female education		-0.005 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.016)		-0.009 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.019)		-0.018 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.018)
HIV prevalence (log scale)	0.034*** (0.011)			0.035*** (0.012)			0.039*** (0.011)		
Physicians (log scale)			0.011 (0.031)			0.009 (0.032)			0.005 (0.030)
IMR (lagged)	1.040*** (0.050)	1.082*** (0.051)	1.116*** (0.055)	1.032*** (0.056)	1.077*** (0.056)	1.093*** (0.055)	1.010*** (0.056)	1.063*** (0.061)	1.094*** (0.063)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.429 (0.417)	-0.620 (0.389)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.355 (0.364)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)								
	Control over Regime Corruption			Control over Executive Corruption			Control over Public-Sector Corruption		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	390	390	342	390	390	342	390	390	342
Countries	99	101	101	99	101	101	99	101	101
Instruments	60	69	78	60	69	78	60	69	78
Hansen-test	0.153	0.174	0.109	0.105	0.155	0.127	0.086	0.126	0.174
AR2	0.164	0.205	0.106	0.175	0.191	0.137	0.176	0.250	0.151

Note: The table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors for different measures of bureaucratic governance according to V-Dem's indices of Control over Regime Corruption, Control over Executive Corruption, and Control over Public-Sector Corruption. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Both DAH and bureaucratic governance are mean-centered. ***, $p < 0.01$, **, $p < 0.05$, *, $p < 0.1$.

Table A5.12. State Capacity vs. Social Engagement: Comparing the Effects of Health Aid on Population

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)						
	Quality of Government	State Fragility	Corruption Control	Regime Corruption	Executive Corruption	Public-sector Corruption	Political Corruption
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAH (log scale)	-0.029** (0.012)	-0.035*** (0.010)	-0.039** (0.016)	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.036*** (0.011)
Social engagement	0.212* (0.113)	0.210** (0.104)	0.156 (0.144)	0.152 (0.118)	0.159 (0.124)	0.141 (0.148)	0.127 (0.137)
DAH (log scale) * Social engagement	-0.204* (0.121)	-0.166* (0.098)	-0.322*** (0.113)	-0.240* (0.134)	-0.280** (0.126)	-0.267* (0.139)	-0.230* (0.127)
Bureaucratic governance	-0.020 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)
DAH (log scale) * Bureaucratic governance	0.001 (0.011)	-0.017* (0.010)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.011)
HIV prevalence (log scale)	0.029*** (0.011)	0.025** (0.011)	0.032** (0.014)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.029*** (0.011)	0.037*** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.014)
IMR (lagged)	1.036*** (0.048)	1.060*** (0.046)	1.058*** (0.054)	1.035*** (0.052)	1.056*** (0.039)	1.042*** (0.058)	1.037*** (0.054)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.540 (0.335)	-0.404 (0.296)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)

Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)						
Quality of Government	State Fragility	Corruption Control	Regime Corruption	Executive Corruption	Public-sector Corruption	Political Corruption
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	187	211	211	211	211	208
Countries	54	62	62	62	62	61
Instruments	78	78	78	78	78	78
Hansen-test	0.994	0.865	0.490	0.910	0.915	0.889
AR2	0.795	0.471	0.895	0.702	0.823	0.720

Note: The table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors comparing the interaction of health aid with both social engagement and different measures of bureaucratic governance. Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Using political instead of social engagement leads to qualitatively similar results (available upon request). Bureaucratic governance is measured using the Quality of Government index (ICRG), State Fragility index, corruption control (WBGI), as well as V-Dem's indices of Control over Regime, Executive, and Public-Sector Corruption. State fragility is inversely related to state capacity, bureaucratic governance, and control of corruption. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, bureaucratic governance, and SEI are mean-centered. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A5.13. Democratic Institutions vs. Social Engagement: Comparing the Effects of Health Aid on Population

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Judicial Constraints	Legislative Constraints	Executive Oversight	Government Accountability	Horizontal Accountability	CSS Ratio	Freedom House	Polity IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DAH (log scale)	-0.037* (0.019)	-0.033*** (0.010)	-0.042** (0.017)	-0.037*** (0.011)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.043*** (0.014)	-0.039*** (0.014)
Social engagement	0.200 (0.126)	0.138 (0.111)	0.151 (0.130)	0.159 (0.104)	0.160 (0.126)	0.204 (0.168)	0.231** (0.113)	0.168 (0.182)
DAH (log scale) * Social engagement	-0.280** (0.130)	-0.205** (0.096)	-0.328** (0.158)	-0.237** (0.099)	-0.278* (0.154)	-0.216*** (0.080)	-0.291*** (0.086)	-0.281*** (0.100)
Democratic oversight	-0.000 (0.085)	-0.015 (0.079)	0.000 (0.017)	0.012 (0.027)	0.003 (0.027)	0.015 (0.099)	-0.022 (0.079)	-0.000 (0.004)
DAH (log scale) * Democratic oversight	-0.004 (0.036)	-0.013 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.000 (0.016)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.062 (0.060)	0.012 (0.028)	0.002 (0.002)
HIV prevalence (log scale)	0.031 (0.019)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.029** (0.012)	0.027** (0.011)	0.030* (0.016)	0.024 (0.015)	0.032* (0.018)
IMR (lagged)	1.057*** (0.072)	1.060*** (0.050)	1.050*** (0.042)	1.081*** (0.051)	1.068*** (0.048)	1.073*** (0.080)	1.097*** (0.068)	1.064*** (0.091)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	-0.577* (0.346)	-0.345 (0.325)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.855 (0.552)	-0.735* (0.402)	0.000 (0.000)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Judicial Constraints	Legislative Constraints	Executive Oversight	Government Accountability	Horizontal Accountability	CSS Ratio	Freedom House	Polity IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	211	211	211	211	211	211	211	211
Countries	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62
Instruments	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
Hansen-test	0.781	0.893	0.800	0.877	0.774	0.803	0.860	0.939
AR2	0.786	0.666	0.928	0.674	0.756	0.372	0.844	0.585

Note: The table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors comparing the interaction of health aid with both social engagement and different measures of horizontal oversight and liberal democracy. Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Using political instead of social engagement leads to qualitatively similar results (available upon request). Horizontal oversight is measured using the V-Dem indices of Judicial, Legislative, and Executive Constraints, as well as the Government Accountability index and the Horizontal Accountability index. Liberal democracy is measured by the CSS ratio, the Freedom House index, and Polity IV. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, democracy, and SEI are mean-centered. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A5.14. Engagement in Political and Professional Organizations and the Effects of Health Aid on Individual Health

	Dependent Variable: Self-Rated Health				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Country level					
DAH (log scale)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)
Engagement in political and professional associations	0.22*** (0.015)	0.20*** (0.015)	0.17*** (0.016)	0.14*** (0.017)	0.15*** (0.017)
DAH (log scale) * Engagement in political and professional associations	0.08*** (0.005)	0.08*** (0.005)	0.06*** (0.008)	0.09*** (0.009)	0.08*** (0.009)
Fertility rate (log scale)		-0.18*** (0.020)	-0.19*** (0.021)	-0.20*** (0.021)	-0.20*** (0.021)
Public-sector corruption control		0.02 (0.027)	-0.07** (0.033)	-0.01 (0.034)	-0.06* (0.034)
Government health expenditures				-0.00*** (0.001)	-0.00*** (0.001)
HIV prevalence (log scale)			0.03*** (0.005)	0.03*** (0.005)	0.03*** (0.005)
Individual level					
Income	0.13*** (0.003)	0.12*** (0.003)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.12*** (0.003)	0.08*** (0.003)
Member in voluntary association (binary)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.00*** (0.002)
Life satisfaction			0.19*** (0.003)		0.19*** (0.003)
Political interest		0.01*** (0.002)		0.02*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
Constant	-1.65*** (0.245)	0.19 (0.173)	-0.16 (0.199)	0.19 (0.191)	0.04 (0.203)
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	Dependent Variable: Self-Rated Health				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
N	98,530	96,106	73,496	71,803	71,346
Countries	50	50	37	36	36
chi2	9,408	7,348	5,705	4,497	5,190
Log likelihood	23,689	23,538	20,900	18,421	20,351

Note: Table shows estimates of multilevel linear regression with random intercept. Civic engagement at the country level is measured as the share of population belonging to political and professional associations using data from the WVS. DAH and civic engagement are global mean-centered. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.
Source: WVS 1995–2015.

Table A5.15. Engagement in Leisure and Welfare Organizations and the Effects of Health Aid on Individual Health

	Dependent Variable: Self-Rated Health				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Country level					
DAH (log scale)	−0.00* (0.001)	0.00*** (0.001)	0.00** (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00** (0.001)
Engagement in leisure and welfare associations	0.10*** (0.012)	0.09*** (0.012)	0.09*** (0.013)	0.06*** (0.014)	0.08*** (0.014)
DAH (log scale)	0.02*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.004)	0.01* (0.005)	0.01*** (0.005)	0.01* (0.005)
* Engagement in leisure and welfare associations					
Fertility rate (log scale)		−0.12*** (0.019)	−0.19*** (0.022)	−0.16*** (0.021)	−0.19*** (0.022)
Public-sector corruption control		0.04 (0.028)	−0.09*** (0.035)	−0.05 (0.034)	−0.09** (0.035)
Government health expenditures				−0.00 (0.001)	−0.00 (0.001)
HIV prevalence (log scale)			0.04*** (0.005)	0.03*** (0.005)	0.04*** (0.005)
Individual level					
Income	0.12*** (0.003)	0.12*** (0.003)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.13*** (0.003)	0.08*** (0.003)
Member in voluntary association (binary)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
Life satisfaction			0.19*** (0.003)		0.19*** (0.003)
Political interest		0.01*** (0.002)		0.02*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
Constant	0.36*** (0.113)	0.17 (0.158)	−0.27 (0.218)	0.02 (0.191)	−0.20 (0.222)
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	Dependent Variable: Self-Rated Health				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	97,489	95,070	73,545	71,854	71,395
Countries	50	50	37	36	36
chi2	8,781	7,076	5,557	4,335	5,017
Log likelihood	23,578	23,422	20,860	18,367	20,303

Note: Table shows estimates of multilevel linear regression with random intercept. Civic engagement at the country level is measured as the share of population belonging to leisure and welfare organizations using data from the WVS. DAH and civic engagement are global mean-centered. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: WVS 1995–2015.

Table A5.16. Engagement in Faith-Based Organizations and the Effects of Health Aid on Individual Health

	Dependent Variable: Self-Rated Health				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Country level					
DAH (log scale)	−0.00*** (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	−0.00** (0.001)	−0.00 (0.001)
Engagement in faith-based associations	−0.02** (0.009)	−0.02** (0.010)	−0.02* (0.010)	−0.09*** (0.013)	−0.06*** (0.012)
DAH (log scale) * Engagement in faith-based associations	−0.02*** (0.003)	−0.03*** (0.003)	−0.01** (0.005)	−0.01 (0.005)	−0.01 (0.005)
Fertility rate (log scale)		−0.18*** (0.024)	−0.20*** (0.023)	−0.20*** (0.023)	−0.22*** (0.023)
Public-sector corruption control		0.23*** (0.033)	−0.06* (0.037)	0.02 (0.038)	−0.04 (0.038)
Government health expenditures				−0.00*** (0.001)	−0.00*** (0.001)
HIV prevalence (log scale)			0.04*** (0.005)	0.04*** (0.005)	0.04*** (0.005)
Individual level					
Income	0.12*** (0.003)	0.12*** (0.003)	0.08*** (0.003)	0.13*** (0.003)	0.08*** (0.003)
Member in voluntary association (binary)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.001)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
Life satisfaction			0.19*** (0.003)		0.19*** (0.003)
Political interest		0.01*** (0.002)		0.02*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
Constant	−0.40*** (0.152)	−1.33*** (0.277)	−0.68*** (0.253)	−0.33 (0.255)	−0.38 (0.267)
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

	Dependent Variable: Self-Rated Health				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	95,912	95,002	73,491	71,803	71,344
Countries	50	50	37	36	36
chi2	7,965	6,765	5,575	4,456	5,119
Log likelihood	23,529	23,423	20,838	18,386	20,301

Note: Table shows estimates of multilevel linear regression with random intercept. Civic engagement at the country level is measured as the share of population belonging to faith-based organizations using data from the WVS. DAH and civic engagement are global mean-centered. Standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: WVS 1995–2015.

Table A5.17. Social Movement Activity and the Effects of Health Aid on Individual Health

	Dependent Variable: Self-Rated Health				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Country Level					
DAH (log scale)	-0.00 (0.001)	-0.00*** (0.001)	-0.00** (0.001)	-0.00*** (0.001)	-0.00** (0.001)
Elite-challenging action	0.09** (0.034)	0.08** (0.034)	0.06* (0.035)	0.05 (0.035)	0.07** (0.034)
DAH (log scale) * Elite-challenging action	0.06*** (0.013)	0.07*** (0.013)	0.08*** (0.012)	0.10*** (0.013)	0.08*** (0.012)
Fertility (log scale)	-0.10*** (0.020)		-0.08*** (0.018)	-0.06*** (0.018)	-0.09*** (0.018)
Public-sector corruption control	-0.12*** (0.030)	-0.16*** (0.027)		-0.10*** (0.029)	
Individual Level					
Income	0.07*** (0.003)	0.07*** (0.003)	0.12*** (0.003)	0.12*** (0.003)	0.12*** (0.003)
Member in voluntary association (binary)	0.00*** (0.002)	0.00*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
Social-movement activity	0.00 (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)	-0.01** (0.003)	-0.01** (0.003)	-0.00 (0.003)
Life satisfaction	0.19*** (0.003)	0.19*** (0.003)			
Political interest	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.02*** (0.002)	0.02*** (0.002)	
Constant	0.23 (0.169)	0.25* (0.135)	0.28* (0.147)	0.43*** (0.141)	0.25* (0.152)
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sex	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	82,102	82,102	82,559	82,559	83,106
Countries	46	46	46	46	46
chi2	6,442	8,361	5,921	5,930	6,001
Log likelihood	22,724	22,713	20,427	20,433	20,519

Note: Table shows estimates of multilevel linear regression with random intercept. Elite-challenging action at the country level is measured by the Social Movement Activity index (SMA). DAH and elite-challenging action are global mean-centered. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Source: WVS 1995–2015.

Table A6.1. Political Engagement, State Capacity, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DAH (log scale)	-0.044*** (0.014)	-0.051*** (0.012)	-0.038*** (0.010)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.040*** (0.011)
Political engagement	0.138 (0.092)	0.133 (0.089)	-0.018 (0.098)	0.011 (0.115)	0.068 (0.079)
DAH (log scale) * Political engagement	-0.143** (0.058)	-0.150*** (0.052)	-0.144*** (0.051)	-0.107* (0.061)	-0.155*** (0.057)
State fragility	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)
DAH (log scale) * State fragility	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)
Political engagement * State fragility	-0.064*** (0.021)	-0.055** (0.023)	-0.032* (0.018)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.037* (0.022)
DAH (log scale) * Political engagement * State fragility	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.020** (0.008)
IMR (lagged)	1.150*** (0.028)	1.096*** (0.043)	1.041*** (0.046)	1.137*** (0.048)	1.075*** (0.051)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.691*** (0.177)	0.000 (0.000)
Fertility rate (log scale)		Yes	Yes		
Physicians (log scale)				Yes	
Female education			Yes		
Region FE					Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	482	482	392	424	482
Countries	124	124	101	124	124
Instruments	77	86	95	86	90
Hansen-test	0.251	0.171	0.275	0.274	0.118
AR2	0.054	0.053	0.178	0.036	0.051

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Political engagement is measured using V-Dem's Participatory Component index. Bureaucratic governance is measured by a country's state fragility, which is inversely related to its capacity to manage conflict, make and implement public policy, and deliver essential services. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, state fragility, and political engagement are mean-centered. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A6.2. Civil-Society Participation, State Capacity, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DAH (log scale)	−0.041*** (0.014)	−0.055*** (0.014)	−0.036** (0.015)	−0.030* (0.016)	−0.046*** (0.014)
Political engagement	0.018 (0.050)	0.071 (0.067)	0.009 (0.076)	−0.044 (0.092)	−0.003 (0.069)
DAH (log scale) * Political engagement	−0.104*** (0.037)	−0.087*** (0.032)	−0.071* (0.039)	−0.064 (0.044)	−0.104*** (0.039)
State fragility	0.000 (0.003)	−0.009* (0.005)	−0.005 (0.005)	−0.007 (0.007)	−0.003 (0.005)
DAH (log scale) * State fragility	−0.005** (0.002)	−0.003** (0.001)	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.004** (0.002)
Political engagement * State fragility	−0.008 (0.010)	−0.034** (0.017)	−0.023 (0.019)	−0.034** (0.015)	−0.015 (0.014)
DAH (log scale) * Political engagement * State fragility	−0.010* (0.006)	−0.016*** (0.006)	−0.013** (0.006)	−0.012* (0.006)	−0.012** (0.005)
IMR (lagged)	0.997*** (0.030)	1.078*** (0.038)	1.044*** (0.039)	1.110*** (0.042)	1.058*** (0.039)
Constant	−0.081 (0.120)	−0.649*** (0.115)	0.000 (0.000)	−0.573*** (0.155)	−0.307* (0.172)
Fertility rate (log scale)		Yes	Yes		
Physicians (log scale)				Yes	
HIV prevalence (log scale)	Yes				
Female education			Yes		
Region FE					Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	390	482	392	424	482
Countries	99	124	101	124	124
Instruments	86	86	95	86	90
Hansen-test	0.443	0.312	0.253	0.189	0.122
AR2	0.052	0.056	0.124	0.040	0.034

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Political engagement is measured using V-Dem’s Civil Society Participation index. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Bureaucratic governance is measured by a country’s state fragility, which is inversely related to its capacity to manage conflict, make and implement public policy, and deliver essential services. DAH, state fragility, and political engagement are mean-centered.

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A6.3. Social Engagement, Corruption Control, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Control over Regime Corruption		Control over Executive Corruption		Control over Public-Sector Corruption		Control over Political Corruption	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DAH (log scale)	-0.048*** (0.014)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.050*** (0.013)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.063*** (0.014)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.054*** (0.015)	-0.014 (0.011)
Social engagement	0.302 (0.193)	0.098 (0.146)	0.259* (0.145)	0.076 (0.133)	0.397** (0.174)	0.133 (0.158)	0.346* (0.178)	0.121 (0.155)
DAH (log scale)	-0.200 (0.122)	-0.133 (0.100)	-0.220** (0.088)	-0.184* (0.095)	-0.147 (0.131)	-0.124 (0.100)	-0.149 (0.108)	-0.092 (0.096)
* Social engagement								
Bureaucratic governance	0.070 (0.079)	0.047 (0.072)	0.039 (0.077)	-0.029 (0.081)	-0.002 (0.098)	0.008 (0.071)	0.097 (0.090)	0.149 (0.105)
DAH (log scale)	0.045 (0.050)	0.041 (0.038)	0.038 (0.046)	0.024 (0.030)	0.060 (0.058)	0.039 (0.041)	0.078 (0.056)	0.068** (0.033)
* Bureaucratic governance								
Social engagement	0.886 (0.748)	0.119 (0.587)	0.548 (0.588)	-0.424 (0.595)	1.537* (0.914)	0.536 (0.540)	1.680* (0.895)	0.882 (0.670)
* Bureaucratic governance								
DAH (log scale)	0.721** (0.360)	0.654** (0.292)	0.620* (0.347)	0.694** (0.290)	0.698 (0.612)	0.631** (0.283)	0.889** (0.446)	0.811** (0.350)
* Social engagement								
* Bureaucratic governance								
IMR (lagged)	1.077*** (0.030)	1.046*** (0.032)	1.080*** (0.025)	1.050*** (0.029)	1.062*** (0.029)	1.028*** (0.028)	1.080*** (0.030)	1.048*** (0.028)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	-0.369** (0.174)	0.113 (0.149)	-0.465*** (0.145)	0.348* (0.194)	-0.314** (0.135)	0.191 (0.189)	0.000 (0.000)

(continued)

Table A6.3. Social Engagement, Corruption Control, and Health Aid Effectiveness (continued)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Control over Regime Corruption	Control over Executive Corruption	Control over Public- Sector Corruption	Control over Political Corruption				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population size	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Government health expenditures		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	263	259	263	259	263	259	260	256
Countries	77	76	77	76	77	76	76	75
Instruments	78	83	78	83	78	83	78	83
Hansen-test	0.299	0.490	0.370	0.445	0.308	0.509	0.317	0.579
AR2	0.677	0.233	0.742	0.218	0.822	0.206	0.648	0.222

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Bureaucratic governance is measured by control over regime corruption (Models 1–2), executive corruption (Models 3–4), public-sector corruption (Models 5–6), and political corruption (Models 7–8). Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, bureaucratic governance, and social engagement are mean-centered. ***, $p < 0.01$, **, $p < 0.05$, *, $p < 0.1$.

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Table A6.4. Elite-Challenging Action, Corruption Control, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)					
	Regime Corruption Control			Executive Corruption Control		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DAH (log scale)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.034** (0.015)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.015)
Elite-challenging action	-0.129 (0.255)	-0.074 (0.214)	0.006 (0.233)	-0.074 (0.214)	-0.163 (0.213)	-0.028 (0.293)
DAH (log scale) * Elite-challenging action	0.163 (0.188)	0.004 (0.182)	-0.127 (0.190)	0.004 (0.182)	0.166 (0.115)	-0.057 (0.155)
Bureaucratic governance	0.037 (0.083)	-0.052 (0.086)	-0.029 (0.115)	-0.052 (0.086)	-0.020 (0.073)	-0.087 (0.072)
DAH (log scale) * Bureaucratic governance	-0.033 (0.057)	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.021 (0.054)	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.091** (0.038)	-0.066 (0.051)
Elite-challenging action * Bureaucratic governance	-0.095 (1.142)	0.770 (1.127)	-0.637 (1.283)	0.770 (1.127)	-0.418 (0.863)	0.409 (1.022)
DAH (log scale) * Elite-challenging Action * Bureaucratic governance	-1.465** (0.739)	-0.970* (0.580)	-0.905* (0.512)	-0.970* (0.580)	-1.727*** (0.623)	-1.175* (0.607)
IMR (lagged)	1.022*** (0.065)	0.911*** (0.058)	0.949*** (0.084)	0.911*** (0.058)	1.043*** (0.050)	0.913*** (0.069)
Constant	-0.323 (0.562)	0.040 (0.375)	-0.139 (0.600)	0.040 (0.375)	-0.422 (0.352)	-0.011 (0.330)

(continued)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)					
	Regime Corruption Control			Executive Corruption Control		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Female education	Yes		Yes			
Fertility rate (log scale)		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	113	126	113	126	126	126
Countries	53	61	53	61	61	61
Instruments	80	82	84	82	78	82
Hansen-test	0.985	0.996	1.000	0.996	0.990	0.997
AR2	0.180	0.351	0.395	0.351	0.338	0.477

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Bureaucratic governance is measured by a country's control of regime corruption (Models 1–4) and executive corruption (Models 5–6). Elite-challenging action is measured by the Social Movement Activity (SMA) index. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, bureaucratic governance, and elite-challenging action are mean-centered. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A6.5. Social and Political Engagement, Liberal Democracy, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)				
	Panel 1: Social Engagement				
	Legislative Constraints	Executive Oversight	Gov. Accountability	Freedom House	CSS Ratio
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DAH (log scale)	−0.024*** (0.007)	−0.016 (0.010)	−0.025*** (0.006)	−0.021*** (0.008)	−0.019** (0.010)
Civic engagement	0.017 (0.019)	0.007 (0.015)	0.024 (0.018)	0.017 (0.015)	0.022 (0.014)
DAH (log scale) * Civic engagement	−0.010 (0.008)	−0.009 (0.007)	−0.011 (0.010)	−0.006 (0.008)	−0.012 (0.010)
Liberal democracy	−0.021 (0.059)	−0.004 (0.013)	0.005 (0.019)	0.043 (0.054)	−0.098 (0.073)
DAH (log scale) * Liberal democracy	−0.005 (0.024)	−0.010 (0.007)	0.004 (0.009)	−0.006 (0.021)	−0.045* (0.027)
Civic engagement * Liberal democracy	−0.005 (0.044)	−0.003 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	0.025 (0.036)	0.111 (0.079)
DAH (log scale) * Civic Engagement * Liberal democracy	0.001 (0.031)	−0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.006 (0.023)	0.008 (0.044)
IMR (lagged)	1.085*** (0.032)	1.080*** (0.032)	1.079*** (0.025)	1.100*** (0.028)	1.077*** (0.025)
Constant	−0.024 (0.299)	0.042 (0.342)	0.017 (0.221)	−0.114 (0.270)	0.000 (0.000)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public-sector corruption					
Observations	377	377	378	378	377
Countries	101	101	101	101	101
Instruments	86	86	86	86	86
Hansen-test	0.118	0.181	0.237	0.373	0.354
AR2	0.805	0.986	0.823	0.799	0.761

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Social engagement is measured by V-Dem’s index of engagement in non-political associations. Political engagement is measured by the average of V-Dem’s engagement in trade and political associations. Liberal democracy is measured by the Legislative Constraints index (Models 1 and 6), Executive Oversight index (Models 2 and 7), Government Accountability index (Models 3 and 8), Freedom House index (Models 4 and 9), and the CSS ratio (Models 5 and 10). Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, social and political engagement, and liberal democracy are mean-centered. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Panel 2: Political Engagement				
Legislative Constraints	Executive Oversight	Gov. Accountability	Freedom House	CSS Ratio
(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
−0.025** (0.010)	−0.011 (0.011)	−0.020** (0.009)	−0.011 (0.010)	−0.007 (0.008)
0.039** (0.019)	0.037** (0.018)	0.038** (0.019)	0.032** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.013)
0.001 (0.008)	−0.005 (0.007)	−0.009 (0.007)	−0.011 (0.007)	−0.008 (0.007)
−0.065 (0.070)	−0.018 (0.014)	−0.005 (0.030)	0.080 (0.065)	−0.065 (0.079)
−0.015 (0.028)	−0.005 (0.007)	0.008 (0.011)	0.015 (0.027)	−0.017 (0.027)
−0.000 (0.039)	0.004 (0.009)	0.007 (0.009)	0.037 (0.024)	0.012 (0.050)
0.034 (0.025)	0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	−0.011 (0.017)	−0.038 (0.027)
1.064*** (0.031)	1.060*** (0.045)	1.063*** (0.049)	1.065*** (0.042)	1.064*** (0.033)
0.000 (0.000)	−0.137 (0.341)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
382	382	383	383	382
102	102	102	102	102
95	95	95	95	95
0.348	0.197	0.174	0.315	0.164
0.759	0.859	0.759	0.993	0.651

Table A6.6. Anti-System Movements, Liberal Democracy, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Freedom House				Dictatorship vs. Democracy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DAH (log scale)	-0.038*** (0.012)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.041*** (0.012)	-0.032*** (0.010)	-0.039*** (0.012)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.020** (0.010)
Elite-challenging action	0.002 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.014)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.021)	0.036** (0.016)
DAH (log scale)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.003 (0.011)
* Elite-challenging action								
Liberal democracy	0.032 (0.065)	0.059 (0.056)	0.089 (0.079)	0.011 (0.049)	-0.007 (0.061)	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.047** (0.021)
DAH (log scale)	-0.075** (0.031)	-0.050* (0.027)	-0.070** (0.030)	-0.070** (0.029)	-0.082** (0.033)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)
* Liberal democracy								
Elite-challenging action	-0.095** (0.044)	-0.067* (0.040)	-0.072* (0.044)	-0.074* (0.040)	-0.080 (0.051)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.019 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.023)
* Liberal democracy								
DAH (log scale)	-0.055** (0.027)	-0.049** (0.025)	-0.060** (0.029)	-0.062** (0.027)	-0.067** (0.030)	-0.024* (0.014)	-0.022* (0.013)	-0.030** (0.014)
* Elite-challenging action								
* Liberal democracy								
IMR (lagged)	1.105*** (0.020)	1.089*** (0.033)	1.091*** (0.034)	1.089*** (0.030)	1.106*** (0.034)	1.080*** (0.023)	1.070*** (0.036)	1.043*** (0.035)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.011 (0.254)	-0.331 (0.293)	0.000 (0.000)	0.022 (0.201)	0.000 (0.000)	0.040 (0.252)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Freedom House				Dictatorship vs. Democracy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Government health expenditures	Yes					Yes		
GDP per capita (log scale)		Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Public-sector corruption		Yes	Yes					
Fertility rate (log scale)		Yes		Yes			Yes	
Region FE					Yes			Yes
Observations	483	484	487	484	484	483	484	484
Countries	124	125	125	125	125	124	125	125
Instruments	83	105	87	96	91	83	96	100
Hansen-test	0.303	0.402	0.247	0.219	0.270	0.229	0.131	0.132
AR2	0.309	0.263	0.445	0.341	0.515	0.277	0.233	0.281

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Elite-challenging action is measured by the Anti-System Movements index. Liberal democracy is measured by the Freedom House index (Models 1–5), and the Democracy vs. Dictatorship index (Models 6–8). Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, elite-challenging action, and liberal democracy are mean-centered. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A6.7. Elite-Challenging Action, Liberal Democracy, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)						Panel 2: Social-Movement Activity			
	Panel 1: Anti-System Movements			Democracy vs. Dictatorship			Executive Oversight			Horizontal Accountability
	Freedom House	CSS Ratio					(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
DAH (log scale)	-0.032*** (0.012)	-0.032*** (0.010)	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.018 (0.022)
Elite-challenging action	0.001 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.015 (0.015)	0.019 (0.015)	0.037** (0.016)	0.030* (0.017)	0.231 (0.337)	0.287 (0.325)	0.206 (0.300)	-0.069 (0.259)
DAH (log scale)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.092 (0.149)	0.088 (0.213)	0.105 (0.181)	-0.017 (0.242)
* Elite-challenging action										
Liberal democracy	0.018 (0.056)	0.080 (0.076)	-0.046 (0.067)	-0.041 (0.072)	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.009 (0.022)	0.049*** (0.019)	0.028 (0.023)	0.055** (0.027)	0.089*** (0.031)
DAH (log scale)	-0.087*** (0.031)	-0.064* (0.033)	-0.073*** (0.026)	-0.084** (0.033)	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.034** (0.015)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.024)
* Liberal democracy										
Elite-challenging action	-0.088* (0.048)	-0.064 (0.044)	-0.119** (0.055)	-0.124** (0.056)	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.022 (0.025)	-0.462 (0.323)	-0.278 (0.253)	-0.326 (0.285)	-0.357 (0.309)
* Liberal democracy										
DAH (log scale)	-0.067** (0.032)	-0.057** (0.028)	-0.043* (0.025)	-0.054* (0.028)	-0.021* (0.012)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.403*** (0.143)	-0.382* (0.203)	-0.338* (0.173)	-0.415* (0.229)
* Elite-challenging action										
* Liberal democracy										
IMR (lagged)	1.111*** (0.029)	1.106*** (0.036)	1.090*** (0.026)	1.072*** (0.027)	1.081*** (0.030)	1.109*** (0.034)	1.013*** (0.045)	0.959*** (0.046)	0.995*** (0.047)	1.011*** (0.061)
Constant	-0.302 (0.336)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.039 (0.238)	-0.402 (0.373)	-0.047 (0.252)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.020 (0.344)	-0.225 (0.481)

Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)									
Panel 1: Anti-System Movements					Panel 2: Social-Movement Activity				
Freedom House		CSS Ratio		Democracy vs. Dictatorship	Executive Oversight		Horizontal Accountability		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflict	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
GDP per capita (log scale)	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Public-sector corruption	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log scale)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fertility rate (log scale)							Yes		
Female education									
Physicians (log scale)						Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	484	484	483	486	487	484	120	113	120
Countries	125	125	125	125	125	125	60	53	60
Instruments	87	96	87	87	87	87	86	80	83
Hansen-test	0.220	0.313	0.182	0.155	0.230	0.112	0.997	0.998	0.997
AR2	0.431	0.330	0.308	0.407	0.277	0.309	0.195	0.185	0.114

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Political engagement is measured by the Anti-System Movements index (Models 1–6) and the Social Movement Activity index (Models 7–10). Liberal democracy is measured by the Freedom House index (Models 1–2), the CSS ratio (Models 3–4), and the Democracy vs. Dictatorship (Models 5–6), Executive Oversight (Models 7–9), and Horizontal Accountability (Model 10) indices. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, elite-challenging action, and liberal democracy are mean-centered. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A6.8. Participatory Environment and Civil-Society Participation, Decentralization, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Panel 1: Social Engagement				Panel 2: Political Engagement			
	Local Government	Locally Elected Executive/ Legislature	Locally Elected Executive/ Legislature	Subnational Authority over Taxing	Power of Local Governments	Power of Regional Governments		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DAH (log scale)	-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.046** (0.022)	-0.044** (0.019)	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.033*** (0.008)	-0.051*** (0.014)	-0.051*** (0.009)
Civic engagement	0.007 (0.014)	0.004 (0.019)	0.063 (0.086)	0.241** (0.104)	0.195 (0.137)	0.076 (0.066)	0.027 (0.114)	0.076 (0.095)
DAH (log scale)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.134** (0.058)	-0.106** (0.054)	-0.055 (0.052)	-0.083** (0.038)	-0.044 (0.053)	-0.039 (0.056)
* Civic engagement								
Decentralization	-0.015 (0.044)	-0.036 (0.033)	-0.061** (0.024)	-0.084** (0.036)	0.019 (0.061)	0.018 (0.012)	0.018 (0.017)	0.020 (0.014)
DAH (log scale)	0.007 (0.031)	0.019 (0.024)	0.022 (0.021)	0.014 (0.019)	0.007 (0.021)	0.014* (0.008)	0.020** (0.009)	0.009 (0.012)
* Decentralization								
Civic engagement	0.002 (0.039)	0.033 (0.023)	0.202** (0.101)	0.281** (0.115)	0.088 (0.208)	-0.021 (0.037)	-0.061 (0.048)	-0.054 (0.063)
* Decentralization								
DAH (log scale)	0.068** (0.028)	0.023* (0.014)	0.136* (0.074)	0.135** (0.068)	0.185** (0.085)	0.026* (0.015)	0.110*** (0.024)	0.073** (0.029)
* Civic engagement								
* Decentralization								
IMR (lagged)	1.075*** (0.041)	1.081*** (0.029)	1.118*** (0.027)	1.034*** (0.054)	0.985*** (0.058)	1.033*** (0.032)	1.004*** (0.051)	1.104*** (0.059)
Constant	0.085 (0.283)	-0.193 (0.216)	0.000 (0.000)	0.239 (0.443)	0.000 (0.000)	0.116 (0.289)	0.154 (0.411)	-0.329 (0.377)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Panel 1: Social Engagement				Panel 2: Political Engagement			
	Locally Elected		Locally Elected Executive/		Subnational Authority over Taxing		Power of Local Governments	
	Local Government	Legislature	Legislature	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	Power of Regional Governments
Basic controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public-sector corruption								
Fertility rate (log scale)					Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Government health expenditures					Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
HIV prevalence (log scale)						Yes		
Female education							Yes	Yes
Observations	478	374	374	374	374	179	469	332
Countries	124	99	99	99	99	47	123	86
Instruments	99	100	86	95	95	101	109	113
Hansen-test	0.205	0.244	0.142	0.074	1	0.397	0.949	0.959
AR2	0.358	0.160	0.101	0.428	0.228	0.112	0.375	0.398

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Social engagement is measured by the CSO Participatory Environment index. Political engagement is measured by the Civil Society Participation index. Decentralization is measured by the Local Government index, the relative power of local governments (Model 6) and regional governments (Models 7–8), whether the executive/legislature is locally elected (Models 2–4), and whether subnational governments have authority over taxing, spending, and legislation (Model 5). Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Basic controls include period fixed effects, conflict, GDP per capita (log scale), and population (log scale). DAH, civic engagement, and decentralization are mean-centered. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A6.9. Social Engagement and Diagonal Accountability, Decentralization, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)								
	Panel 1: Social Engagement				Panel 2: Political Engagement				
	Regional Government				Power of Local Governments		Locally Elected Executive/ Legislature		Subnational Authority over Taxing
					(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
DAH (log scale)	-0.040*** (0.014)	-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.042*** (0.011)	-0.040*** (0.010)	-0.045*** (0.014)	-0.067*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.015)	-0.024*** (0.010)	
Civic engagement	0.324** (0.161)	0.311*** (0.096)	0.287** (0.118)	0.245** (0.122)	0.015 (0.027)	0.027 (0.032)	0.037 (0.024)	0.034 (0.024)	
DAH (log scale) * Civic engagement	-0.205* (0.106)	-0.125 (0.118)	-0.176* (0.098)	-0.193** (0.081)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.013)	-0.020 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.007)	
Decentralization	0.039 (0.055)	0.042 (0.055)	0.027 (0.055)	0.023 (0.052)	0.023* (0.013)	0.024 (0.018)	-0.061* (0.034)	0.013 (0.049)	
DAH (log scale) * Decentralization	0.061* (0.034)	0.050* (0.026)	0.068*** (0.022)	0.053** (0.022)	0.015 (0.010)	0.014 (0.010)	0.006 (0.020)	0.004 (0.017)	
Civic engagement * Decentralization	0.323 (0.437)	0.092 (0.350)	0.106 (0.313)	0.133 (0.464)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.075** (0.037)	0.015 (0.041)	
DAH (log scale) * Civic Engagement * Decentralization	0.666** (0.334)	0.475* (0.288)	0.440** (0.208)	0.307* (0.175)	0.013** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.025 (0.017)	0.031** (0.015)	
IMR (lagged)	1.146*** (0.047)	1.124*** (0.041)	1.042*** (0.046)	1.043*** (0.058)	1.089*** (0.031)	1.111*** (0.035)	1.050*** (0.040)	1.033*** (0.025)	
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	-0.578 (0.402)	-0.239 (0.320)	0.000 (0.000)	0.093 (0.347)	0.010 (0.304)	0.208 (0.401)	0.126 (0.333)	

Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)								
Panel 1: Social Engagement			Panel 2: Political Engagement					
Regional Government			Power of Local Governments		Power of Regional Governments		Locally Elected Executive/ Legislature	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Basic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public-sector corruption	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fertility rate (log scale)		Yes	Yes					
Government health expenditures			Yes					
Observations	263	263	259	473	409	374	179	
Countries	77	77	76	124	107	99	47	
Instruments	86	95	109	95	95	95	92	
Hansen-test	0.405	0.801	0.971	0.142	0.240	0.237	1	
AR2	0.818	0.697	0.848	0.422	0.330	0.420	0.181	

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Social engagement is measured by the Social Engagement Index. Political Engagement is measured by the Diagonal Accountability index. Decentralization is measured by the Regional Government index (Models 1–4), the relative power of local governments (Model 5) and regional governments (Model 6), whether the executive/legislature is locally elected (Model 7), and whether subnational governments have authority over taxing, spending, and legislation (Model 8). Basic controls include period fixed effects, conflict, GDP per capita (log scale), and population (log scale). Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. DAH, civic engagement, and decentralization are mean-centered. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A6.10. Anti-System and Pro-Democratic Movements, Decentralization, and Health Aid Effectiveness

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Panel 1: Anti-System Movements				Panel 2: Pro-Democratic Movements			
	Locally Elected Executive/ Legislature		Local Government Exists		Regional Government Elected		Local Government Exists	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DAH (log scale)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.035** (0.014)	0.042 (0.046)	0.016 (0.044)	0.003 (0.011)	0.001 (0.009)	0.179** (0.081)	0.229** (0.109)
Civic engagement	0.049** (0.021)	0.008 (0.019)	0.004 (0.062)	0.012 (0.066)	0.019* (0.011)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.265** (0.130)	-0.300** (0.139)
DAH (log scale) * Civic engagement	0.035** (0.017)	0.029** (0.014)	0.015 (0.038)	0.007 (0.049)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.011)	0.196** (0.094)	0.243** (0.105)
Decentralization	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.006 (0.025)	0.009 (0.087)	-0.021 (0.084)	0.017* (0.010)	0.016 (0.012)	0.189* (0.101)	0.270* (0.149)
DAH (log scale) * Decentralization	-0.037 (0.028)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.069 (0.043)	-0.046 (0.043)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.185** (0.082)	-0.246** (0.108)
Civic engagement * Decentralization	-0.034 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.036)	0.014 (0.068)	0.002 (0.073)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.012 (0.008)	0.274** (0.123)	0.322** (0.144)
DAH (log scale) * Civic engagement * Decentralization	-0.058*** (0.020)	-0.037** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.039)	-0.022 (0.053)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.014* (0.009)	-0.204** (0.094)	-0.257** (0.104)
IMR (lagged)	1.014*** (0.056)	0.931*** (0.052)	1.116*** (0.038)	1.054*** (0.046)	1.077*** (0.042)	1.070*** (0.043)	1.064*** (0.052)	1.060*** (0.038)
Constant	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.462 (0.303)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.502 (0.343)	-0.666 (0.410)	0.000 (0.000)

	Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality Rate (Log Scale)							
	Panel 1: Anti-System Movements				Panel 2: Pro-Democratic Movements			
	Locally Elected Executive/ Legislature	(2)	(3)	(4)	Regional Government Elected	(6)	(7)	Local Government Exists
Basic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Public-sector corruption	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fertility rate (log scale)				Yes		Yes		Yes
Physicians (log scale)	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes	
HIV prevalence (log scale)		Yes						
Observations	268	254	484	484	280	280	333	375
Countries	80	65	125	125	83	83	99	100
Instruments	112	112	85	94	104	113	90	91
Hansen-test	0.974	1	0.144	0.220	0.935	0.991	0.558	0.682
AR2	0.341	0.949	0.174	0.257	0.746	0.592	0.847	0.664

Note: Table shows two-step GMM estimation with Windmeijer bias-corrected robust standard errors. Health aid (DAH) is lagged by one period. Decentralization measures indicate whether the executive/legislature is elected locally (Models 1–2), whether a local government exists (Models 3–4 and 7–8), and whether the regional government/legislature is elected (Models 5–6). The Regional Government Elected index is recoded so that 0 indicates regional offices are not elected, 1 indicates the regional executive is elected, 2 indicates the regional assembly is elected but not the executive, and 3 indicates both regional executive and assembly are elected. Elite-challenging action is measured by the Anti-System Movements index (Models 1–4) and Pro-Democratic Movements index (Models 5–8). Basic controls include period fixed effects, conflict, GDP per capita (log scale), and population (log scale). DAH, civic engagement, and the continuous measures of decentralization are mean-centered. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.