 | Pindar's Homer The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past a machine readable edition Gregory Nagy | |
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§1. The historiâ 'inquiry' of Herodotus, like the ainos of epinician poets like Pindar, claims to extend from the epic of heroes. Like the ainos of Pindar, the historiâ of Herodotus is a form of discourse that claims the authority to possess and control the epic of heroes. I propose to support these assertions by examining the structure of Herodotus' narrative, traditionally known as the Histories, and by arguing that the traditions underlying this structure are akin to those underlying the ainos of Pindar's epinician heritage. 1 With reference to my working definition, in Chapter 1, of song, poetry, and prose, I argue that the study of Herodotus, master of prose, will help further clarify our ongoing consideration of the relationship between song in Pindar and poetry in epic.
§2. As in the songs of Pindar, the figure of Homer is treated as the ultimate representative of epic in the prose of Herodotus (e.g., 2.116-117). 1 In fact, the poetry of Homer along with that of Hesiod is acknowledged by Herodotus as the definitive source for the cultural values that all Hellenes hold in common:
hothen de egenonto hekastos tôn theôn, eite aiei êsan pantes, hokoioi te tines ta eidea, ouk êpisteato mechri hou prôên te kai chthes hôs eipein logôi. Hêsiodon gar kai Homêron hêlikiên tetrakosioisi etesi dokeô meu presbuterous genesthai kai ou pleosi. houtoi de eisi hoi poiêsantes theogoniên Hellêsi kai toisi theoisi tas epônumias dontes kai timas te kai technas dielontes kai eidea autôn sêmênantes. hoi de proteron poiêtai legomenoi toutôn tôn andrôn genesthai husteron, emoige dokeein, egenonto toutôn. ta men prôta hai Dôdônides hiereiai legousi, ta de hustera ta es Hêsiodon te kai Homêron echonta egô legô.
But it was only the day before yesterday, so to speak, 2 that they [= the Hellenes] came to understand wherefrom 3 the gods originated [= root gen-], whether they all existed always, and what they were like in their visible forms [eidos plural]. For Hesiod and Homer, I think, lived not more than four hundred years ago. These are the men who composed [= verb poieô] a theogony [with root gen-] for the Hellenes, who gave epithets [epônumiai] 4 to the gods, who distinguished their various tîmai [= spheres of influence] 5 and tekhnai [= spheres of activity]\, 6 and who indicated [= verb sêmainô] 7 their visible forms. 8 And I think that those poets who are said to have come before these men really came after them. 9 The first part of what precedes 10 is said by the priestesses of Dodona. 11 The second part, concerning Hesiod and Homer, is my opinion. 12
§3. Not only does Herodotus stress the Panhellenic importance of Homer and Hesiod. He takes both a Homeric and a Hesiodic stance. Let us begin with his Homeric stance, 1 which is evident at the beginning of the Histories, the so-called prooemium. 2 Although I have no doubt that Herodotus had Homer in mind when he composed the prooemium of the Histories, I plan to show in what follows that the prose narrative of the Histories is the product of an oral tradition in its own right, related to but not derived from the poetic narrative of the Iliad. 3
§4. I now quote the prooemium of Herodotus in its entirety:
Hêrodotou Halikarnêsseos historiês apodexis hêde, hôs ta de barbaroisi apodechthenta, aklea genêtai, ta te alla kai di' hên aitiên epolemêsan allêloisi 1
This is the public presentation [= noun apo-deixis] 2 of the inquiry [historiâ] 3 of Herodotus of Halikarnassos, with the purpose of bringing it about In particular 6 [this apodeixis of this historiâ concerns] why (= on account of what cause [aitiâ]) they entered into conflict with each other. 7
§5. It is important to pay careful attention here in the prooemium to the development of thought that links the noun apodeixis 'public presentation' with the verb from which it is derived, apo-deik-numai, to be found in the clause b that follows. We would expect this verb in the middle voice to mean 'make a public presentation of', that is, 'publicly demonstrate, make a public demonstration'; there are contexts where such a translation is indeed appropriate. Thus when Xerxes has a canal made in order to turn the isthmus of Mount Athos into an island, he is described as ethelôn te dunamin apodeiknusthai kai mnêmosuna lipesthai 'wishing to make a public demonstration of his power and to have a reminder of it left behind' (Herodotus 7.24; cf. 7.223.4). Combined with the direct object gnômên / gnômâs 'opinions, judgments', this verb in the middle voice is used in contexts where someone is presenting his views in public; the contexts include three specific instances of self-expression by Herodotus (2.146.1, 7.139.1, 8.8.3). 1 Yet in the context of the prooemium, and also in other Herodotean contexts where apo-deik-numai in the middle voice is combined, as here, with the direct object ergon / erga 'deed(s)', it is to be translated simply as 'perform' rather than 'make a public presentation or demonstration of'. Thus in Powell's Lexicon to Herodotus we can find 29 contexts where apo-deik-numai, in combination with direct objects like ergon / erga, is translated as 'perform'. 2 In the prooemium that we have just read, for example, the reference is to the megala erga 'great deeds' that have been apodekhthenta 'performed' by Hellenes and barbarians alike. If we translated apodekhthenta here as 'publicly presented' or 'demonstrated' instead of 'performed', the text would not make sense to us. So also 'performed' is suggested in a context like the following, where a dying Kallikrates expresses his deep regret
hoti ouden esti hoi apodedegmenon ergon heôutou axion prothumeumenou apodexasthai
that there was no deed performed by him that was worthy of him, though he had been eager to perform [one].
Clearly this young man's sorrow is not over the fact that he has not made a public display of a great deed but over the more basic fact that he does not have a great deed to display. The obvious explanation for these usages of apo-deik-numai in the sense of performing rather than publicly presenting or demonstrating or displaying a deed is that the actual medium for publicly presenting the given deed is in all these cases none other than the language of Herodotus. In other words, performing a deed is the equivalent of publicly presenting a deed because it is ultimately being displayed by the Histories of Herodotus.
§6. Similarly saying something is in the case of Herodotus the equivalent of writing something because it is ultimately being written down in the Histories (e.g., 2.123.3, 4.195.2, 6.14.1, 7.214.3; cf. also Hecataeus FGH 1 F 1). 1 In other words saying and writing are treated as parallel speech-acts. 2 This sort of parallelism goes one step beyond what we have seen in the use of ana-gignôskô 'know again, recognize' in the sense of 'read out loud', as in Aristophanes Knights118, 1011, 1065. 3 This meaning of ana-gignôskô is a metaphorical extension of the notion of public performance, as we see in Pindar Olympian10.1, where the corresponding notion of the actual composition by the poet is kept distinct through the metaphor of an inscription inside the phrên 'mind' (10.2-3). 4 As for the language of Herodotus, in contrast, not only the composition but also the performance, as a public speech-act, can be conveyed by the single metaphor of writing. For Herodotus, the essential thing is that the writing, just like the saying, is a public, not a private, speech-act (again 7.214.3). 5 The historiâ 'inquiry' that he says he is presenting in the prooemium of the Histories is not a public oral performance as such, but it is a public demonstration of an oral performance, by way of writing. Moreover, the very word apodeixis, referring to the 'presentation' of the historiâ in the prooemium, can be translated as the 'demonstration' of such oral performance.
§7. Whereas Herodotus represents his writings as a public presentation, Thucydides represents his as if they were private: they are a ktêma...es aiei 'a possession for all time' (1.22.4), where the noun ktêma, derivative of the verb kektêmai 'possess', conveys the notion of private property. 1 Moreover, Thucydides avoids the words historiâ and historeô, 2 as also apodeixis 'public presentation' (with only one exception, at 1.97.2). 3 In the Histories of Herodotus, by contrast, precisely such words designate the performative aspect of the words of Herodotus taken all together. To return to the first words in the prooemium to the Histories of Herodotus, this whole composition is in itself an act of apodeixis 'public presentation': Hêrodotou Halikarnêsseos historiês apodexis hêde 'this is the apodeixis of the historiâ of Herodotus of Halikarnassos'. 4
§8. Wherever apo-deik-numai designates the performance of a deed (or the execution of a monument, as in Herodotus 1.184, etc.), the performance (or execution) is tantamount to a public presentation as long as it can be sustained by a medium of public presentation. 1 As Herodotus declares in the prooemium, the apodeixis 'public presentation' of his Histories is for the purpose of ensuring that the great deeds performed by Hellenes and barbarians alike should not be akleâ 'without kleos'. This purpose of sustaining kleos is a traditional one, already built into the inherited semantics of the verb apo-deik-numai: the great deeds are already being literally apodekhthenta 'publicly presented' because they are in the process of being retold in the medium of Herodotus--just as they had been retold earlier in the medium of his predecessors. 2 These predecessors of Herodotus, as the wording of the transition from the prooemium to the Histories proper makes clear, come under the designation of logioi (Herodotus 1.1.1). For reasons that become clear as the discussion proceeds, I consistently translate logioi as 'masters of speech'.
§9. In order to grasp the concept of logioi, I draw attention to the word for the particular subject of the Histories, namely, the aitiâ 'cause' of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians: ta te alla kai di' hên aitiên epolemêsan allêloisi 'in particular, [the apodeixis concerns\fR;] why (= on account of what cause [aitiâ]) they entered into conflict with each other' (Herodotus prooemium). This word is immediately picked up in the first sentence of the Histories proper: Perseôn men nun hoi logioi Phoinikas aitious phasi genesthai tês diaphorês 'the logioi of the Persians say that it was the Phoenicians who were the cause of the conflict' (Herodotus 1.1.1). This transition reveals that Herodotus, in concerning himself with the aitiâ 'cause' of the conflict, is implicitly a logios 'master of speech' like his pro-Persian counterparts, explicitly called logioi, who concern themselves with the question: who were the cause of the conflict? 1
§10. As we learn from the language of Pindar, it is the function of logioi 'masters of speech' to confer kleos:
plateiai pantothen logioisin enti prosodoi | nason euklea tande kosmein: epei sphin Aiakidai | eporon exochon aisan aretas apodeiknumenoi megalas 1
Wide are the approaching paths from all sides, for the logioi to adorn this island with glory [kleos]; for the Aiakidai have conferred upon this island an exceptional share [i.e., of glory], 2 presenting [apo-deik-numai] great achievements [aretê plural].
Just as both Hellenes and barbarians can have their deeds apodekhthenta 'publicly presented' and thus not become akleâ 'without kleos' by virtue of apodeixis 'public presentation' as explicitly conferred by Herodotus, 3 so also the lineage of Achilles, the Aiakidai, can go on 'publicly presenting', apodeiknumenoi, their achievements even after death--by virtue of the public display implicitly conferred by the logioi, who are described here in the language of Pindar as a source of kleos. 4
§11. Elsewhere the language of Pindar draws the logioi into an explicit parallelism with aoidoi 'poets', and the emphasis is on their enshrining the achievements of those who have long since died:
opithombroton auchêma doxas | oion apoichomenôn andrôn diaitan manuei | kai logiois kai aoidois. ou phthinei Kroisou philophrôn areta.
The proud declaration of glory that comes in the future is the only thing that attests, both for logioi and for singers [aoidoi], the life of men who are now departed; the philos-minded achievement [aretê] of Croesus fails 1 not. 2
This explicit parallelism of logioi and aoidoi should be compared with that of logoi 'words' and aoidai 'songs' in Nemean6 (aoidai kai logoi 30), 3 the same poem from which I have just quoted the only other attestation of logioi in Pindar's epinician lyric poetry. 4 Let us turn back, then, to Nemean6:
euthun' epi touton, age Moisa, ouron epeôn | euklea: paroichomenôn gar anerôn, | aoidai kai logoi 5 ta kala sphin erg' ekomisan
In the direction of this house, Muse, steer the breeze, bringing good kleos, of these my words. For even when men are departed, aoidai and logoi 6 bring back the beauty of their deeds.
In short the language of Pindar makes it explicit that logioi 'masters of speech' are parallel to the masters of song, aoidoi, in their function of maintaining the kleos 'glory' of men even after death, and it implies that this activity of both logioi and aoidoi is a matter of apodeixis 'public presentation'.
§12. As for Herodotus, I have already argued that he is by implication presented at the very beginning of his Histories as one in a long line of logioi, 1 and he makes it explicit that his function of maintaining kleos is a matter of apodeixis. 2 Accordingly I find it anachronistic to interpret logioi as 'historians'. 3
§13. The medium of logioi, as the contexts of apodeixis make clear, is at least ideologically that of performance, not of writing. Like the poets, the logioi can recreate with each performance the deeds of men. That is what Pindar's words have told us. Thus the aretê 'achievement' of a Croesus, for example, as we have just read in Pindar's Pythian1, 1 does not 'fail' (verb phthi-) 2 because it is transmitted by logioi and aoidoi. In this particular case we even have actual attestations of parallel but mutually independent Croesus stories in the prose narrative of one who speaks in the mode of a logios (Herodotus 1.86-91) and in the poetic narrative of an aoidos (Bacchylides Epinician 3.23-62). 3 It would seem then that the logios is a master of oral traditions in prose, just as the aoidos is a master of oral traditions in poetry and song. 4
§14. The notion that a logios, just like an aoidos, can prevent the transience of a man's aretê 'achievement' is found not only in Pindar: we have seen it conveyed twice in the prooemium of Herodotus. The first time around, it occurs in the negative purpose clause hôs mête ta genomena ex anthrôpôn tôi chronôi exitêla genêtai 'with the purpose of bringing it about that whatever results from men may not, with the passage of time, become exitêla [= evanescent]'. This clause is then coordinated with another negative purpose clause, this second one being more specific than the first: mête erga megala te kai thômasta, ta men Hellêsi, ta de barbaroisi apodechthenta, aklea genêtai 'and that great and wondrous deeds--some of them performed by Hellenes, others by barbarians--may not become akleâ [= without kleos]'. 1
§15. In other attested contexts, the adjective exitêlos can designate such things as the fading of color in fabrics (Xenophon Oeconomicus 10.3) or in paintings (Pausanias 10.38.9), the loss of a seed's generative powers when sown in alien soil (Plato Republic 497b), and the extinction of a family line (Herodotus 5.39.2). The references to vegetal and human evanescence reveal this adjective to be semantically parallel to the verb phthi-, which I have been translating as 'fail' in its application to the transience of man's aretê. 1 Moreover, the adjective aphthiton, derived from phthi- and translatable as 'unfailing, unwilting', 2 is a traditional epithet of kleos in the inherited diction of praise poetry, as when the poet Ibycus makes the following pledge to his patron Polykrates:
kai su, Polukrates, kleos aphthiton hexeis
hôs kat' aoidan kai emon kleos
You too [i.e., you as well as the heroes just mentioned in the song], Polykrates, will have kleos that is unfailing [aphthiton], in accordance with my song, my kleos. 3
What emerges then from this comparison of phraseology in song, poetry, and prose is that the two negative purpose clauses in the prose prooemium of Herodotus--the first one intending that human accomplishments should not be evanescent and the second, that they should not be without kleos--amount to a periphrasis of what is being said in the single poetic phrase kleos aphthiton.
§16. In this regard we may compare various Platonic passages concerning the concept of collective memory as a force that preserves the extraordinary and erases the ordinary. 1 To be noted especially is the expression tina diaphoran...echon 'that which has some distinctness to it' in designating that which deserves to be recorded, at Plato Timaeus 23a. In this sense the memory of oral tradition is at the same time a forgetting of the ordinary as well as a remembering of the extraordinary (but exemplary). Such an orientation is parallel to what is being expressed by ta te alla kai 'in particular' in the prooemium of Herodotus. 2 Also to be noted are the similarities between the prooemium of Herodotus and the following Platonic passage:
pros de Kritian ton hêmeteron pappon eipen...hoti megala kai thaumasta têsd' eiê palaia erga tês poleôs hupo chronou kai phthoras anthrôpôn êphanismena, pantôn de hen megiston, hou nun epimnêstheisin prepon an hêmin eiê soi te apodounai charin kai tên theon hama en têi panêgurei dikaiôs te kai alêthôs hoionper humnountas enkômiazein.
He [= Solon] said to Critias my grandfather... 3 that there were, inherited by this city, ancient deeds, great and wondrous, that have disappeared through the passage of time and through destruction brought about by human agency. He went on to say that of all these deeds, there was one in particular that was the greatest, which it would be fitting for us now to bring to mind, giving a delightful compensation [kharis] to you [= Socrates] while at the same time rightly and truthfully praising [enkômiazein] the goddess on this the occasion of her festival, just as if we were singing hymns to her [humnountas].
The emphasis in the phrase pantôn de hen megiston 'there was one in particular that was the greatest' is comparable with the emphasis in the phrase ta te alla kai di' hên aitiên epolemêsan allêloisi 'in particular, [this apodeixis of this historiâ concerns] why (= on account of what cause [aitiâ]) they entered into conflict with each other' in the prooemium of Herodotus. 4
§17. The reciprocal relation between the man whose accomplishments or qualities are celebrated by kleos aphthiton and the man who sings that kleos is made explicit in the words quoted earlier from Ibycus. To paraphrase: "My kleos will be your kleos, because my song of praise for you will be your means to fame; conversely, since you merit permanent fame, my song praising you will be permanent, and consequently I the singer will have permanent fame as well." 1 A parallel relation exists between the man who presents an apodeixis 'public presentation' of his Histories on the one hand, and on the other the Hellenes and barbarians whose accomplishments are apodekhthenta 'publicly presented' and thereby not evanescent, not without kleos.
§18. The self-expressive purpose of Herodotus, to maintain kleos about deeds triggered by conflict, brings to mind the Iliad. Besides the fact that Homeric poetry refers to itself as kleos, 1 Achilles himself specifically refers to the Iliadic tradition, which will glorify him forever, as kleos aphthiton (IX 413). 2 Moreover, this glorification is achieved in terms of a story that ostensibly tells of a conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon in the context of a larger conflict between Achaeans and Trojans, that is, the Trojan War. This larger conflict is subsumed by the even larger conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, subject of historiâ 'inquiry' on the part of Herodotus. 3 Like the Homer of Pindar, the Homer of Herodotus is being subsumed by a form of communication that goes beyond epic.
§19. The notion that the framework of the historiâ of Herodotus subsumes the framework of the Iliad is implied by the prooemium of Herodotus as compared with that of the Iliad. The expression di' hên aitiên 'on account of what cause...' in the prooemium of Herodotus, 1 which asks the question why the Hellenes and barbarians came into conflict with each other, is functionally analogous to the question posed in the prooemium of the Iliad: that is, why did Achilles and Agamemnon come into conflict with each other (Iliad I 7-12)? 2 The latter conflict results in the mênis 'anger' of Achilles (Iliad I 1), which in turn results in the deaths of countless Achaeans and Trojans (I 2-5). 3 These heroes would not have died when they did, in the course of the Iliad, had it not been for the anger of Achilles; in other words the prooemium of the Iliad assumes that the original conflict of Achilles and Agamemnon resulted in the Iliad. Similarly the prooemium of the Histories of Herodotus assumes that the original conflicts of Hellenes and barbarians resulted in the Histories. In both cases the search for original causes motivates not just the events being narrated but also the narration. From the standpoint of the prooemia of the Iliad and of the Histories, Herodotus is in effect implying that the events narrated by the Iliad are part of a larger scheme of events as narrated by himself.
§20. For Herodotus, the question of the prooemium, di' hên aitiên epolemêsan allêloisi 'on account of what cause they came into conflict with each other', begins to be answered in the first sentence of the narratise proper: Perseôn men nun hoi logioi Phoinikas aitious phasi genesthai tês diaphorês 'the logioi of the Persians say that it was the Phoenicians who were the cause of the conflict' (Herodotus 1.1.1). 1 The semantic relationship here between the noun aitiâ 'cause' and the subsequent adjective aitios, which I have just translated as 'the cause', can best be understood by considering the definition of aitios in the dictionary of Liddell and Scott as 'responsible for' in the sense of 'being the cause of a thing to a person'. 2 There is a juridical dimension of aitios in the sense of 'guilty' and aitiâ in the sense of 'guilt', operative throughout the Histories of Herodotus. 3 We may compare the semantics of Latin causa, which means not only 'cause' but also 'case, trial', and the derivatives of which are ac-cûs-âre and ex-cûs-âre. In the case of Herodotus' main question, what was the aitiâ 'cause' of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, the inquiry proceeds in terms of asking who was aitios 'responsible, guilty'. From the standpoint of the logioi who speak on behalf of the Persians, Herodotus says, the Phoenicians were first to be in the wrong, aitioi (1.1.1): they abducted Io, and 'this was the first beginning of wrongs committed' (tôn adikêmatôn prôton touto arxai 1.2.1). This wrong is then righted when the Hellenes abduct Europa, and 'this made things even for them' (tauta men dê isa pros isa sphi genesthai 1.2.1). But then the Hellenes reportedly committed a wrong, thereby becoming aitioi 'responsible' (meta de tauta Hellênas aitious tês deuterês adikiês genesthai 1.2.1), when they abducted Medea. This wrong is in turn righted when Paris abducts Helen (1.2.3). Up to this time, from the standpoint of the Persian logioi, there have been two cycles of wrongs righted: first the barbarians were aitioi, and the Hellenes retaliated; then the Hellenes were aitioi, and the barbarians retaliated. From then on, however, according to the Persians, the degree of wrongdoing escalated when the Achaeans captured Troy:
to de apo toutou Hellênas dê megalôs aitious genesthai: proterous gar arxai strateuesthai es tên Asiên ê spheas es tên Eurôpên.
From here on, [they say that] it was the Hellenes who were very much in the wrong [aitioi], because it was they who were the first to begin to undertake a military campaign into Asia, instead of their [= the Persians'] undertaking a military campaign into Europe.
According to this Persian scenario then, the third and greatest cycle of wrongs to be righted is completed when the Persians finally invade Hellas.
§21. Against this backdrop of the Trojan and Persian Wars, the testimony of Herodotus links up with the ongoing inquiry into the aitiâ 'cause' of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians. We have heard from the barbarians. Now we hear from Herodotus:
tauta men nun Persai te kai Phoinikes legousi. egô de peri men toutôn ouk erchomai ereôn hôs houtôs ê allôs kôs tauta egeneto, ton de oida autos prôton huparxanta adikôn ergôn es tous Hellênas, touton sêmênas probêsomai es to prosô tou logou, homoiôs smikra kai megala astea anthrôpôn epexiôn. ta gar to palai megala ên, ta polla autôn smikra gegone, ta de ep' emeu ên megala, proteron ên smikra. tên anthrôpêiên ôn epistamenos eudaimoniên oudama en tôutôi menousan epimnêsomai amphoterôn homoiôs.
So that is what the Persians and Phoenicians say. But I will not go on to say whether those things really happened that way or some other way. Instead, relying on what I know, I will indicate [= verb sêmainô] who it was who first committed wrongdoing against the Hellenes. I will move thus ahead with what I have to say, as I proceed through great cities and small ones as well. For most of those that were great once are small today; and those that used to be small were great in my time. Understanding that the good fortune [eudaimoniâ] of men never stays in the same place, I will keep in mind both alike.
§22. The very next word brings into focus the cause that Herodotus gives for the conflicts between Hellenes and barbarians that he is about to narrate: it is Croesus the Lydian (1.6.1), 1 who is described as the turannos 'tyrant' (ibid.) of the mighty Lydian Empire that preceded and was then replaced by the Persian Empire. It was Croesus, says Herodotus, who first compelled Hellenes to pay tribute to a barbarian (1.6.2); 2 'before the rule of Croesus, all Hellenes were still free [eleutheroi]' (pro de tês Kroisou archês pantes Hellênes êsan eleutheroi 1.6.3). 3 Herodotus' overall narrative explains the cause of the Ionian Revolt, which ultimately provokes the Persian invasion of Hellas, as provoked in the first place by the 'enslavement' of the Hellenes of Asia (5.49.2-3). 4 At the time of the Ionian Revolt, the 'enslaved' Hellenes were subject to the Persians; but the very first man to have 'enslaved' them was Croesus, tyrant of the Lydian Empire.
§23. It is important to notice that Herodotus qualifies his assertion that Croesus was the first man ever to 'enslave' free Greek cities:
houtos ho Kroisos barbarôn prôtos tôn hêmeis idmen tous men katestrepsato Hellênôn es phorou apagôgên...
This Croesus was the first barbarian ever, within our knowledge, to reduce some Hellenes to the status of paying tribute... 1
The expression tôn hêmeis idmen 'within our knowledge' picks up the earlier expression that leads to the identification of Croesus as the cause of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians--or at least of that part of the conflict that is narrated by Herodotus:
ton de oida autos prôton huparxanta adikôn ergôn es tous Hellênas, touton sêmênas probêsomai es to prosô tou logou, homoiôs smikra kai megala astea anthrôpôn epexiôn.
Relying on what I know, I will indicate [= verb sêmainô] who it was who first committed wrongdoing against the Hellenes. I will move thus ahead with what I have to say, as I proceed through great cities and small ones as well.
§24. The wording of what we have just read is reminiscent not of the Iliad, prime epic of the Trojan War, but of the Odyssey. Thus we come to the second aspect of the Herodotean appropriation of Homer. 1 In the discussion that follows, the focus is on two particular passages in the Odyssey that serve to illuminate the wording of Herodotus.
§25. Let us begin by considering the prooemium of the Odyssey. After a reference to the destruction of Troy by Odysseus (Odyssey i 2), the hero's many subsequent wanderings are described in the following words:
pollôn d' anthrôpôn iden astea kai noon egnô
He saw the cities of many men, and he came to know their way of thinking [noos].
The correlation here of seeing (iden) with consequent knowing kai noon egnô) recapitulates the semantics of perfect oida: "I have seen: therefore I know." 1 This general quest of Odysseus is parallel to a specific quest that was formulated for him by the seer Teiresias; this brings us to the second pertinent passage from the Odyssey. In this passage we find Odysseus himself saying to Penelope:
epei mala polla brotôn epi aste' anôgen
elthein
since he [= Teiresias] ordered me to proceed through very many cities of men.
Teiresias had told Odysseus to undertake this quest after the hero has killed the suitors (xi 119-120); 2 specifically Odysseus is to go inland, with an oar on his shoulder, until it is mistaken for a winnowing shovel (xi 121-137; xxiii 265- 284). This experience, says Teiresias, will be a sêma 'sign, signal' for Odysseus (xi 126; xxiii 273). In such contexts the coding of a sêma in the dimension of seeing is analogous to the coding of an ainos in the dimension of hearing. 3 The sêma of Teiresias bears a twofold message: what is an oar for seafarers is a winnowing shovel for inlanders. The message of this sêma, however, is twofold neither for the seafarers nor for the inlanders since the former can surely distinguish oars from winnowing shovels while the latter are presented as knowing only about winnowing shovels. Rather the message is twofold only for Odysseus as the traveler since he sees that the same signal has two distinct messages in two distinct places: what is an oar for the seafarers is a winnowing shovel for the inlanders. 4 In order to recognize that one sêma can have more than one message, Odysseus must travel-- polla brotôn epi astea...elthein 'to proceed through many cities of men' (again xxiii 267-268). 5 The wording brings us back to Herodotus, who describes himself as homoiôs smikra kai megala astea anthrôpôn epexiôn 'proceeding through great cities and small ones as well' (again 1.5.3), in his quest to investigate the cause of the conflict that he is to narrate. Figuratively Herodotus travels along the 'roads of logoi' from city to city, much as Odysseus travels in his heroic quest. This argument meshes with the larger argument that the Homeric stance of Herodotus engages not only the Iliad but also the Odyssey.
§26. It would be a mistake, however, to explain this as well as other correspondences in the wording of Homer and Herodotus as a simple matter of borrowing by Herodotus. It is a built-in tradition in the diction of Herodotus to imagine the process of narration itself as if it were a process of traveling along a road: for example, when he is ready to investigate the replacement of the Lydian Empire of Croesus by the Persian Empire of Cyrus, Herodotus says that he is about to tell 'the true and real logos [= word]' (ton eonta logon 1.95.1), 1 though he would be capable of revealing three other alternative 'roads of logoi [= words]' (epistamenos...kai triphasias allas logôn hodous phênai 1.95.1). 2 Here we see a close parallelism between the traditions of Herodotus' historiâ and Pindar's ainos in that the same image of narration as the process of traveling along a road is extensively used in the diction of epinician poetry. 3
§27. The ideological correspondence between the quest of Odysseus and the quest described by Herodotus runs even deeper. Matching the sêma 'signal' that Odysseus gets from Teiresias is a sêma given by Herodotus when he indicates who committed the wrongdoing that led to the conflict that he narrates while traveling down the road through cities large and small: as we have seen, the word that expresses the idea of 'indicate' is sêmainô, derivative of sêma (1.5.3). The choice of this word in indicating that the wrongdoer was Croesus is apt in that sêmainô denotes a mode of communication that is implicit as well as explicit. The narrative of Herodotus never says explicitly how the wrongdoing of Croesus is linked with the previous wrongdoings in the ongoing conflict between Hellenes and barbarians. Up to the point where Croesus is named, the series of wrongdoings had reached a climax in the Trojan War. In the version attributed to the logioi who speak on behalf of the Persians, the Hellenes were in the wrong when they undertook the Trojan War, and the barbarians were in the right when they retaliated with the Persian War, about to be narrated in the Histories. 1 But the narrator of the Histories never says explicitly that this version is false. Instead he keeps saying it implicitly. Something else happened between the Trojan War and the Persian War, and that was the 'enslavement' of the Hellenes of Asia by Croesus (1.5.3, in conjunction with 1.6.1-3). 2 Thus even if the Hellenes had been in the wrong when they undertook the Trojan War, the barbarians had already retaliated for that wrong. The Ionian Revolt, in reaction to the 'enslavement' of the Hellenes (Herodotus 5.49.2-3), 3 would not count as a wrongdoing in the latest cycle of wrongdoing and retaliation, in that Herodotus clearly does not accept the Persian premise that all Asia belongs to the Persians (1.4.4). Thus the real wrong in the latest cycle of wrongdoing and retaliation is the invasion of Europe by the barbarians in the Persian War. Again, Herodotus does not say this explicitly but implicitly, and the word that he uses to designate his mode of communication is sêmainô (1.5.3). We are reminded of the mode in which the god Apollo himself communicates:
ho anax, hou to manteion esti to en Delphois, oute legei oute kruptei alla sêmainei
The Lord whose oracle is in Delphi neither says nor conceals: he indicates [= verb sêmainô]. 4
§28. In his investigations of causes, Herodotus himself follows the convention of communicating in this mode. For example, in discussing the cause alleged by Croesus for his attack on Cyrus, namely, the usurpation of Median hegemony by the Persians, Herodotus promises to indicate the original cause of that usurpation:
...di' aitiên tên egô en toisi opisô logoisi sêmaneô
...on account of a cause [aitiâ] that I will indicate [= verb sêmainô] in later logoi. 1
As François Hartog points out, he who sêmainei 'indicates' does so on the basis of some privileged position of knowledge, as when scouts, having their special vantage point by having ascended to an elevated place, can then run down to indicate to those below the movements of the enemy (Herodotus 7.192.1 esêmainon, 7.219.1 esêmênan). 2 The privileged position of Herodotus brings to mind the ultimately privileged position of the Delphic Oracle, with its all-encompassing knowledge, revealing mastery of such "facts" as the number of grains of sand in the universe (Herodotus 1.47.3). 3 When Herodotus sêmainei 'indicates', he seems to have comparable authority within the realm of what he indicates, revealing mastery of such "facts" as the full dimensions of Scythia as it stretches from the Istros to the sea (4.99.2), the precise length of the Royal Road leading from the Mediterranean seacoast all the way to Susa (5.54.1), 4 and, more figuratively, all the 'roads of logoi' along which his predecessors have traveled (2.20.1). 5 Most important, he also knows who is aitios 'responsible' for the all-encompassing conflict that he narrates as he sêmainei 'indicates' that it is Croesus (again 1.5.3). 6
§29. Thus when Herodotus sêmainei 'indicates', he does so on the basis of superior knowledge. We now see that he is doing something more than simply qualifying his statement when he indicates that Croesus was aitios 'responsible' for the conflict that he will narrate:
houtos ho Kroisos barbarôn prôtos tôn hêmeis idmen tous men katestrepsato Hellênôn es phorou apagôgên
This Croesus was the first barbarian ever, within our knowledge, to reduce some Hellenes to the status of paying tribute...
These words pick up the earlier wording:
ton de oida autos prôton huparxanta adikôn ergôn es tous Hellênas, touton sêmênas probêsomai es to prosô tou logou, homoiôs smikra kai megala astea anthrôpôn epexiôn.
Instead, relying on what I know, I will indicate [= verb sêmainô] who it was who first committed wrongdoing against the Hellenes. I will move thus ahead with what I have to say, as I proceed through great cities and small ones as well.
Figuratively Herodotus owes his privileged position of knowledge to the many roads of logoi 'words' that he travels (again 1.95.1) 1 as he proceeds through cities great and small.
§30. This privileged position is analogous to that of Odysseus, who 'saw the cities of many men, and came to know their way of thinking [noos]' (Odyssey i 3), the same man who was ordered by the seer Teiresias 'to proceed through very many cities of men' (xxiii 267-268). 1 Moreover, the discourse used by Herodotus in expressing his superior knowledge is likewise Odyssean. To sêmainein 'indicate' is to speak in a code bearing more than one message. Messages can be immediate as well as ulterior, even about the central theme of the conflict between Hellenes and barbarians, presented as an extension of the Iliadic theme of the Trojan War. In this respect the discourse of Herodotus is akin to that of the ainos as represented in the Odyssey. When the disguised Odysseus tells his host Eumaios a story about the Trojan War, bearing both the immediate message that he needs a cloak and the ultimate message that he is to be identified as Odysseus (xiv 462-506), 2 he is complimented by Eumaios for telling a good ainos (xiv 508). 3 In fact Odysseus is traditionally represented as a master of the ainos, as evident from his particularized epithet polu-ainos 'he of many ainoi' (e.g., xii 184). 4
§31. Thus the Homeric stance of Herodotus, in reflecting both Iliadic and Odyssean themes, is analogous to the stance of the disguised Odysseus as he tells his ainos: the subject is Iliadic, but the context is Odyssean. The Homeric stance of Herodotus is also analogous to the stance of an epinician poet like Pindar, whose medium is likewise a type of ainos. 1 Like Herodotus, Pindar too conventionally represents himself as traveling along 'roads of logoi'. 2 Moreover, Pindar's diction reveals an ideology according to which he too has a lofty vantage point of knowledge. As a seer sêmainei 'indicates' by way of a koruphê 'culmination, summing up' of logoi 'words' (Pindar Paean 8a.13-14 kai toiaide koruphai samainen logôn) , 3 so also the man who gets praise from Pindaric song must understand the poet's koruphê of logoi:
ei de logôn sunemen koruphan, Hierôn, | orthan epistai, manthanôn oistha proterôn
If you understand, Hieron, the unerring culmination [koruphê] of words [logoi], you know, learning from those who have gone before, that...
§32. How then are we to read the message of Herodotus, if indeed he stands in such a privileged position of knowledge? We must look for signs, and we come back to the sêma 'sign' given by Herodotus when he sêmainei 'indicates' that Croesus the Lydian was aitios 'responsible' for the conflict that is narrated (1.5.3). The immediate message here is that even if the Persian logioi were correct in determining who was aitios 'responsible' for each wrongdoing up to the Trojan War--in which case the ancestors of the Hellenes would have been in the wrong--the Persian War nevertheless puts the Persians, not the Hellenes, in the wrong because of the intervening wrongs committed by Croesus. 1 But there is also an ulterior message here, one that we can best understand by first confronting the question: who was in the wrong in the Iliad?
§33. The main theme of the Iliad, the mênis 'anger' of Achilles, which leads to the deaths of countless Achaeans and Trojans, 1 is caused by the insult of Agamemnon, whom Achilles holds aitios 'responsible' (Iliad I 335; cf. XIII 111). 2 In the later reconciliation scene between the two heroes, however, when Achilles finally renounces his mênis (XIX 35, 75), Agamemnon claims that he was not aitios (XIX 86), but that it was Zeus--along with Moira